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subject to diﬀerent criteria. This analysis illuminates and oﬀers normative
implications for controversies in a variety of legal fields, including constitutional,
international, tax, corporate, contract, and antitrust law. The reconceptualization of
the corporation as a “nexus for regulation” as well as a “nexus for contracts” oﬀers an
† Professor of Law, FGV Law School in São Paulo. I am grateful to Amitai Aviram, Reuven
Avi-Yonah, Ian Ayres, Paulo Furquim de Azevedo, Aaron Dhir, Rui Dias, Luca Enriques, Martin
Gelter, George Georgiev, Ronald Gilson, Zohar Goshen, Henry Hansmann, Geoﬀ Hodgson, Klaus
Hopt, Michael Klausner, Michael Knoll, Reinier Kraakman, Jedediah Kroncke, Jonathan Macey, Jose
Miguel Mendoza, Paul Miller, Sergio Mittlaender, Joshua Mitts, John Morley, Florian Möslein,
Juliana Pela, Elizabeth Pollman, Edward Rock, Michael Simkovic, David Skeel, Holger Spamann,
Richard Squire, Eric Talley, Doron Teichman, Robert B. Thompson, Otávio Yazbek, Kristin van
Zwieten, and participants in the faculty workshops at Columbia, Chicago, FGV, George Mason,
Hastings, Illinois, Oxford, and USC law schools for very helpful comments and discussions. All
errors are my own.

(717)

718

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 717

additional, and heretofore overlooked, rationale for the organization of economic
activity under the corporate form in the United States and around the world.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 719
I. THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS FOR REGULATION ................. 725
II. THE ORIGINS OF VEIL PEEKING .............................................. 728
A. Early Constitutional Cases ...........................................................729
B. Enemy Corporations in the World Wars .......................................... 731
C. Early Antitrust and Regulatory Enforcement .................................. 733
D. Jim Crow Discrimination ............................................................. 735
III. VEIL PEEKING VS. VEIL PIERCING ........................................... 736
A. Directional and Structural Diﬀerence............................................. 738
B. Distributional and Ideological Implications ..................................... 739
C. Frequency of Application .............................................................. 740
D. Areas of Law ............................................................................. 740
E. Diﬀerent Boundaries ................................................................... 741
IV. UNPACKING VEIL PEEKING ...................................................... 742
A. The Types of Veil Peeking Problems ................................................ 742
1. The Problem of Permissible Regulatory Diﬀerentiation ....... 742
2. The Problem of Permissible Regulatory Arbitrage ............... 743
3. The Problem of Aggregation and Pass-Through
Imputation ......................................................................... 743
B. A Taxonomy of Veil Peeking ..........................................................744
1. Explicit Veil Peeking by Lawmakers vs. Judicial Veil
Peeking as Gap Filling .......................................................744
2. Shareholder-Friendly vs. Shareholder-Unfriendly Veil
Peeking ..............................................................................744
3. Untailored (Categorical) vs. Tailored Veil Peeking ............... 745
V. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY PARTITIONING
AND VEIL PEEKING ................................................................. 749
A. The Costs and Benefits of Asset and Regulatory (De)Partitioning .......749
B. Criteria for the Application of Veil Peeking ...................................... 755
VI. VEIL PEEKING IN CONTEMPORARY LAW .................................. 757
A. Incorporating Race ...................................................................... 757
B. Antitrust .................................................................................. 760
C. Nationality ................................................................................762
D. Jurisdiction ................................................................................ 767
E. Tax Laws ................................................................................. 769
F. International Sanctions ................................................................ 772
G. Government Corporations ............................................................ 773
H. Corporate Law ........................................................................... 776

2021]

Veil Peeking

719

I.
J.

Contract Law ............................................................................ 778
Miscellaneous Regulations and Social Sanctions............................... 779
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 780
INTRODUCTION
As a legal person or entity, a corporation is the repository of rights and
duties in its own name. It is legally separate from its shareholders and
managers. Current scholarship has come to regard asset partitioning—the
separation between the assets of the corporation and those of its
shareholders—as the essential economic role performed by legal personality.1
The law also recognizes exceptions to asset partitioning and provides for “departitioning remedies,”2 of which veil piercing is the most prominent.3
Through veil piercing, courts overcome the attribute of limited liability to
hold shareholders liable for corporate debts in certain circumstances.4
1 Business corporations exhibit a strong form of asset partitioning. The attribute of limited
liability or entity shielding prevents corporate creditors from reaching shareholders’ assets. The
attribute of capital lock-in or strong entity shielding prevents shareholders and their creditors from
reaching the corporation’s assets. Scholars have argued that entity shielding is more important and
fundamental to the rise of the ﬁrm than limited liability. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 394, 434-35 (2000) (discussing
the protection of corporate assets against liquidation); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 44041 (2003) (describing the shift to, and motivations behind, incorporation during the nineteenth
century, and explaining that the pursuit of limited liability was not the sole cause); Henry
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1338 (2006) (“[E]ntity shielding is the sine qua non of the legal entity”). Others have described
legal personality as asset partitioning in mitigating agency costs and shaping capital structure. See
George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral,
and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (2004); Edward M.
Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 520-21
(2007); see also Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Theory of Business Organizations 10, 23 (Amsterdam L.
Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 2018-32, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3296232 (positing
that organizational law serves “to depersonalize business” by detaching a pool of assets from the
individuals behind it); Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment Device, 70 VAND. L. REV.
1303, 1306 (2017) (arguing that organizations serve the role of property relinquishment by owners, a
feature that is complementary to asset partitioning).
2 Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, External and Internal Asset Partitioning: Corporations and
Their Subsidiaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 251,
252 (Jeﬀrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
3 Other doctrines that operate to mitigate asset partitioning are substantive consolidation in
bankruptcy and the use of agency law to treat subsidiaries as agents of the parent company in certain
circumstances. Id.
4 There is a voluminous literature on veil piercing. See generally Peter Oh, Veil Piercing, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 81, 90-91 (2010) (discussing empirical research on veil piercing); Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991) (oﬀering an
empirical study of veil-piercing cases); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP.
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Yet asset partitioning is but one dimension of corporate separateness.
Asset partitioning mostly aﬀects creditor and shareholder rights and is
particularly well suited to the prevailing economic conception of the
corporation as a “nexus of contracts”5 (or, more accurately, as a “nexus for
contracts”6). But beyond its fundamental role as a nexus for contractual
relationships with private counterparties, the corporation also operates as a
distinct nexus for the imputation of legal rights and duties vis-à-vis the state,
including in ways that do not directly implicate asset partitioning.7 The
corporation is best described as a “nexus of imputation”8 that serves both as a
“nexus for contracts” and as a “nexus for regulation.”
To operate as a nexus for both regulation and contracts, the corporate
form provides for regulatory partitioning, which is the separation between
the legal spheres of the corporation and its shareholders for purposes of the
imputation of legal rights and duties beyond the attribution of assets. To
illustrate, let us look at the example of Alice, a prominent entrepreneur who
also holds a small number of shares in Apple Inc., a publicly traded company.
Alice is a French citizen, while Apple is a U.S. company incorporated in
California. Regulatory partitioning means that Apple is not bound by the
non-compete covenants that Alice has signed in connection with her business.
If Alice is convicted of a crime and is therefore debarred from contracting
with the federal government, Apple is not aﬀected by this sanction. This form
of separation between the legal spheres of Alice and Apple is essential to the

L. 479 (2001) (advocating the replacement of veil piercing doctrine with direct liability); Jonathan
Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 102 (2014) (conducting an empirical study and suggesting
that veil piercing serves three distinctive policy goals).
5 The conception of the firm as a nexus of contracts comes from Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976). This conception built on A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972) (emphasis omitted), which
described the ﬁrm as “the centralized contractual agent in a team productive process.” The phrase
“nexus of contracts” comes from Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 293 (1980).
6 John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is Corporate
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
1, 5 (3d ed. 2017).
7 This Article refers to rights and duties as a short form for the various related legal concepts
described in Hohfeld’s classic work, such as disabilities, immunities, privileges, and powers. See
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913–14) (noting the breadth of the term “rights” and its indiscriminate use to
cover diﬀerent concepts).
8 Legal theorist Hans Kelsen famously described the nature of natural persons and legal
persons as essentially a point of “imputation” or “central imputation.” HANS KELSEN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 50 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson &
Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934).
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operation of large-scale enterprise with multiple shareholders and
transferable shares.9
This Article identiﬁes the role of regulatory partitioning as an essential,
but thus far overlooked, form of legal separation supplied by the corporate
form. A signiﬁcant portion of corporations around the world are formed for
regulatory rather than contracting reasons. Importantly, this Article also
shows that regulatory partitioning is not absolute. In various ﬁelds and for
diﬀerent purposes, the law engages in what I term veil peeking by looking at
shareholder characteristics to impute certain rights or duties of shareholders
to the corporation without compromising the attribute of limited liability to
reach the personal assets of shareholders. In our example, if Alice were a
controlling shareholder of Apple, lawmakers and courts would sometimes
extend Alice’s non-compete obligations and debarment sanctions to Apple, as
well as deem Apple to be French.
Regulatory partitioning comes under pressure when there are potential
diﬀerences in the legal regime applicable across natural persons, between
natural persons and legal entities, or across diﬀerent legal entities. These
diﬀerences raise important questions. Which legal rights should individuals,
ﬁrms, or states be able to obtain through incorporation? Which legal rights
should individuals, ﬁrms, or states be deemed to forfeit through
incorporation? To what extent should individuals, ﬁrms or states retain their
legal status despite incorporation?
The tension between regulatory partitioning and veil peeking lies at the
heart of key contemporary and perennial controversies involving the
corporate form. The issues are diverse and momentous. Should the
fundamental rights of individuals (such as free speech and religious liberty)
apply to corporations as a vehicle for their exercise? Do a parent and a wholly
owned subsidiary count as separate entities for purposes of a conspiracy under
antitrust law? Can a subsidiary be sued based on jurisdictional grounds
applicable to its parent? Can the race of individual shareholders be imputed
to the corporation for purposes of antidiscrimination laws? Does the
nationality of corporate shareholders matter for the application of
international investment treaties or wartime restrictions? Can citizens raise
constitutional rights against a corporation whose shares are owned by the
government? When is it lawful to adopt the corporate form to circumvent

9 In the absence of regulatory partitioning, either destructive legal instability would ensue or
share transferability would be signiﬁcantly impaired. This form of regulatory shielding is
functionally analogous to the key economic role of entity shielding (or aﬃrmative asset
partitioning), which prevents shareholders’ creditors from attaching corporate assets. See generally
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390; Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at 1338 (discussing three
types of entity shielding).
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legal constraints applicable to individuals or other legal entities, ranging from
homestead exemptions to non-compete covenants?
In response to these questions, lawmakers and courts have sometimes
decided to “peek”—or look behind the corporate veil—to ascribe legal rights
or duties of shareholders to the corporation, thereby mitigating regulatory
partitioning.10 Although veil peeking is deep-rooted and recurrent, it has
largely escaped dedicated analysis.11 From the ﬁrst article on veil piercing in
the early twentieth century to countless judicial decisions and pieces of
scholarship (old and new), veil peeking has been improperly equated with, or
subsumed under, veil piercing doctrine, which generally holds shareholders
liable for corporate obligations.12
10 Veil peeking is not to be confused with the regulation of shareholder rights and conduct in
their own name. Regulatory partitioning separates the legal spheres of shareholders and the
corporation, but certainly does not eliminate the role of shareholders in corporate governance.
11 German scholarship has usefully distinguished between the related concepts of “liability
penetration” (Haftungsdurchgriﬀ) and “imputation penetration” (Zurechnungsdurchgriﬀ) without,
however, theorizing about their scope, attributes, criteria, and implications. See infra notes 89–90
and accompanying text.
12 This conﬂation dates back to Maurice Wormser’s seminal article coining the term “piercing
the veil,” which analyzes, in equal proportion, several instances of both veil peeking and veil piercing
as an exception to limited liability. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM.
L. REV. 496, 498-502, 518 (1912) (collecting cases indicating the courts’ “willingness to adjust the
entity theory to the evergrowing complexities and constantly increasing problems of the modern
business corporation”). Today, while both regulatory departitioning and asset departitioning
continue to be treated under the umbrella of veil piercing, the latter is undoubtedly the dominant
conception of the term. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 4, at 1036 (“‘Piercing the corporate veil’
refers to the judicially imposed exception to this principle by which courts disregard the separateness
of the corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation’s action as if it were the
shareholder’s own.”); Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 481 (“From a litigation standpoint, veil piercing
allows creditors to satisfy their claims out of the personal assets of shareholders.”). For a
representative example of the prevailing conﬂation of veil piercing and veil peeking, see Brief for
Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-7, Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. The
central issue in Hobby Lobby was whether a business corporation qualiﬁed as a person for purposes
of the broad protection of religious liberty provided under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993—a quintessential veil peeking question. See id. at 2 (discussing Hobby Lobby’s argument
“that the religious values of its present controlling shareholders should pass through to the
corporation itself ”). In their Amicus Brief, forty-four corporate and criminal law professors cited
veil piercing authorities for the existence of “very narrow” exceptions to corporate separateness and
the requirement of a showing of “signiﬁcant misconduct and fraud” to argue against Hobby Lobby’s
assertion of religious rights as “reverse piercing.” Id. at 6-7, 16; see also ADAM WINKLER, WE THE
CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 52-62 (2018)
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in attributing constitutional rights to
corporations as veil piercing). A recent review of Winkler’s book points out that the Supreme
Court’s corporate rights jurisprudence diﬀers sharply from veil piercing as a doctrinal exception to
limited liability, but incorrectly assumes that by engaging in veil peeking, “the Supreme Court’s
[approach] is radically at odds with the existential theory of the corporation it adopts in every other
area of the law.” Joshua C. Macey, What Corporate Veil?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2019). Instead,
this Article demonstrates that veil peeking is pervasive.
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This Article examines veil peeking from a legal and economic perspective
as a separate category of exceptions to corporate separateness that is
analytically and functionally distinct from veil piercing. Veil piercing tempers
asset partitioning by imposing shareholder liability for contracts, torts, or
regulatory claims. Veil peeking mitigates regulatory partitioning by enabling
the imputation of shareholder rights or duties to the corporation.13 Because
asset partitioning and regulatory partitioning serve diﬀerent functions, veil
piercing (as asset departitioning) and veil peeking (as regulatory
departitioning) are subject to distinct tradeoﬀs.
In dissociating the regulatory status of the corporation from its
shareholder composition, regulatory partitioning has important beneﬁts.
First, it permits shares to be priced and ﬁrms to be valued independently of
shareholder identity. This form of depersonalization of ﬁrms—which is also
aided by limited liability—facilitates share transfers, enhances liquidity, and
promotes the market for corporate control. Second, regulatory partitioning
oﬀers a bright-line rule that is easy to apply, which reduces regulatory costs.
Nevertheless, regulatory partitioning may at times undermine the
eﬀectiveness of the regulatory scheme in question by encouraging regulatory
arbitrage, and is therefore set aside through veil peeking.
By tracing their use in the United States and in other jurisdictions
throughout history, this Article maps the relative role of regulatory
partitioning and the broad incidence of veil peeking across diﬀerent legal
ﬁelds. It also shows that, although clearly distinct from veil piercing along
several dimensions, veil peeking is not a unitary category. It then advances a
taxonomy to unpack the diﬀerent manifestations of veil peeking, which can
originate from legislatures or courts, beneﬁt or harm shareholder interests,
and operate in a categorical or tailored fashion. Finally, it examines the extent
to which veil peeking promotes the use of the corporate form or compromises
its core attributes, oﬀering guidance for courts and policymakers.
This analysis produces clear normative implications. It challenges a
recurrent argument about the eﬀects of corporate personhood, which goes as
follows: because the corporation is a separate legal person and enjoys limited
liability, it should be treated as legally separate from its shareholders in all
areas of law. Scholars have gone as far as to derive concrete normative
implications from the concept of legal personality, from a stakeholder

13 Alternatively, one could refer to asset departitioning as “liability veil piercing” and to
regulatory departitioning as “regulatory veil piercing.” Veil peeking (or regulatory veil piercing) is
not to be confused with liability veil piercing in connection with the enforcement of government
regulations backed by monetary penalties, as when the state goes after the assets of a parent company
to collect ﬁnes for the violation of environmental law. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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orientation in corporate law to a critique of corporate constitutional rights
grounded on the individual rights of shareholders.14
By contrast, this Article shows that exceptions to regulatory partitioning
through veil peeking are pervasive across history and legal ﬁelds, which makes
corporate separateness an “on-and-oﬀ ” construct depending on the purpose
of any given form of regulation. Unlike veil piercing, which is inevitably antishareholder and pro-regulation, veil peeking has no clear partisan
connotation: it can be used both to augment and to frustrate the privileges of
shareholders and the regulatory power of the state.15 Moreover, asset
partitioning and regulatory partitioning are not necessarily subject to the
same boundaries, nor is regulatory partitioning subject to uniform boundaries
across legal issues or areas of law.
The Article also oﬀers concrete guidance for courts in adjudicating veil
peeking cases. It shows that judicial veil peeking essentially concerns the
interpretation or gap ﬁlling of legal texts. It comes into play when the
constitution, statute, treaty, or contract in question is unclear about the
treatment of corporate entities. In deciding such controversies, courts should
rely on the classical tenets of construction or interpretation, and consider the
extent to which upholding regulatory partitioning would serve to frustrate
the purpose of the regulatory scheme in question.
This proposed approach diﬀers sharply from some of the prevailing
criteria required for veil piercing as an exception to limited liability, whose
application is deemed to be exceptional, invariably dependent on a factintensive inquiry, and subject to restrictive requirements, such as fraud or
commingling of assets. Veil peeking does not necessarily pose a threat to the
core economic functions of the corporation, as frequently assumed. While
some courts have intuitively grasped the distinction between asset
departitioning and regulatory departitioning, many others have unduly
applied inappropriate veil piercing tests to veil peeking controversies.

14 See Jonathan R. Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law 4-5 (U.
of Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 18-28, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118
(relying on the conception of the corporation as a juridical entity with limited liability to criticize
the attribution of constitutional rights to corporations as “associations of citizens”). See generally
KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 27
(2018) (linking corporate personhood to a vision of pluralistic governance of corporations); LYNN
STOUT ET AL., THE MODERN CORPORATION: STATEMENT ON COMPANY LAW 2 (2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848833 (claiming that the concept of legal personhood is incompatible
with the assertions that shareholders own corporations and that directors are obligated to maximize
proﬁts for shareholders).
15 The recurrent uses of veil peeking to augment the regulatory power of the state raise doubt
about the common reliance on corporate separateness and institutional (“social entity”) conceptions
of the corporation as a strategy to accomplish progressive objectives.
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the
critical role of regulatory partitioning and the resulting conception of the
corporation as a nexus for regulation. Part II describes the emergence of veil
peeking in the history of the corporate form. Part III presents the key
structural diﬀerences between veil peeking and veil piercing. Part IV unpacks
the concept of veil peeking by outlining its main functions and oﬀers a
taxonomy of its diﬀerent modalities. Part V examines the economic
properties of regulatory partitioning and veil peeking, evaluating their
interaction with the core elements of the corporate form. Part VI shows the
ubiquity and signiﬁcance of veil peeking controversies in diﬀerent areas of
contemporary law, including constitutional, antitrust, international, tax,
corporate, and contract law. I conclude by highlighting the importance of
unbundling incorporation to recognize the diﬀerent functions performed by
legal personality.
I. THE CORPORATION AS A NEXUS FOR REGULATION
A leading economic conception of the corporation, which has been
particularly inﬂuential in legal scholarship, emphasizes “the essential
contractual nature of ﬁrms.”16 It views the corporation as a nexus for
contractual relationships, including those with workers, suppliers, ﬁnancial
creditors, shareholders, and even government bodies.17 This nexus-ofcontracts conception, however, fails to mention the key non-contractual
relationships between the corporation and the state. Such neglect is likely
attributable, at least in part, to the focus on markets and private ordering that
characterizes economics as a discipline.18

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 311.
Id. at 310.
The privatized nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation deliberately served to
undermine the defense of corporate social responsibility in the 1970s by oﬀering an alternative to
the competing concession theory, which viewed incorporation as a favor from the state, and the real
entity theory, which appeared to support a stakeholder orientation of corporate activities. In their
seminal work advancing the nexus-of-contract theory, Jensen and Meckling explicitly highlight its
normative implications in delegitimizing corporate social responsibility. In their words,
16
17
18

[v]iewing the ﬁrm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals
also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the ﬁrm implied by asking
questions such as “what should be the objective function of the ﬁrm?”, or “does the
ﬁrm have a social responsibility” is seriously misleading.
Id. at 311. In another article in the same period, Jensen and Meckling warned about the destruction
of the large corporation due to what they viewed as mounting government regulation. See Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Can the Corporation Survive?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1978,
at 31, 32 (arguing that, due to growing government intervention in the economy, “[t]he corporate
form of organization . . . is likely to disappear completely”).
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Economic theories of the ﬁrm often proceed in an institutional and legal
vacuum, downplaying the role of law and state institutions.19 However, Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have famously showed that law is essential
for the functioning of the corporate form. It is law, rather than private
contracting alone, that endows business entities with strong asset
partitioning, enabling the ﬁrm to operate as an eﬀective nexus for contracts.20
It is also law that endows corporations with regulatory partitioning, which is
an equally essential, though thus far neglected, attribute of the corporation’s
role as a nexus for contracts.
Yet the economic conception of the ﬁrm as a nexus for contracts and the
economic conception of legal entities as a tool for asset partitioning are
certainly complementary. The key economic function of asset partitioning is
to economize on contracting costs.21 In fact, law-and-economics scholarship
has long questioned the eﬃciency of shareholder limited liability vis-à-vis
non-contractual creditors, such as tort claimants and the state.22 The legal
19 An exception is the seminal work of Ronald Coase, which mostly equates the economic
concept of the ﬁrm with the legal concept of an employer and employee relationship. R. H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403-05 (1937) (“[T]he deﬁnition [of a ﬁrm] we have given
is one which approximates closely to the ﬁrm as it is considered in the real world.”). For recent
defenses of the constitutive role of law in the economic concept of the ﬁrm, see generally ERIC W.
ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013); Simon Deakin, David Gindis,
Geoﬀrey M. Hodgson, Kainan Huang & Katharina Pistor, Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the
Constitutive Role of Law, 45 J. COMPAR. ECON. 188, 194 (2017) (arguing that ﬁrms “have to be treated
as creatures of the law, where law itself is irreducible to custom or private ordering”).
20 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 393. The authors’ deﬁnition of legal entities
includes organizational forms that lack formal legal personality, such as marriage and the commonlaw trust, but which provide for strong or weak forms of asset partitioning. Id. at 390. Although the
present Article focuses on business corporations, it is important to note that other organizational
forms also oﬀer regulatory partitioning to varying degrees. For instance, partnerships often do not
provide for regulatory partitioning with respect to tax and jurisdictional matters, but are treated as
“collective entities” not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Similarly, gun trusts were used until recently to avoid identiﬁcation and background check
requirements for the purchase of ﬁrearms. For a discussion of the varying degrees of regulatory
partitioning across diﬀerent legal entities, including partnerships, the trust, and marriage, see
Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Partitioning as a Key Role of Corporate Personality, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson
eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 16-20), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3719913.
The longstanding tension between “entity” and “aggregate” conceptions of partnerships mostly reflect varying
levels of regulatory partitioning across different areas of law. Id.
21 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 408 (“Organizational law eliminates the need
for . . . elaborate contracting and thereby avoids the transaction costs and moral hazard it involves.”).
22 The very scholars who coined the term asset partitioning have cast doubt on the eﬃciency
of limited liability with respect to corporate torts. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879-80, 1882 (1991) (arguing
that limited liability for corporate torts may promote ineﬃcient behavior and questioning such
protection). Earlier arguments also questioned the efficiency of limited liability vis-à-vis involuntary
creditors. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Aﬃliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
499, 519-20 (1976) (noting that pursuing separate incorporations for purposes of evading tort
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relationships between a corporation and the state, however, far transcend the
liability issues associated with asset partitioning.
The role of the corporation as a separate nexus for the imputation of rights
and duties vis-à-vis the state, rather than vis-à-vis contracting parties alone,
has been central throughout its history. Early corporations required speciﬁc
governmental approval and formed a distinct nexus for regulation, which
conferred both beneﬁts and costs on this organizational form compared to the
legal regime governing natural persons and other business associations. A key
feature of corporate charters up until the mid-nineteenth century was the
concession of monopoly privileges by the state, an important advantage of
incorporation that is distinct from asset partitioning.23
Interestingly, the corporation of the early nineteenth century was not only
a nexus for regulation, but corporate charter provisions were the technique
par excellence for state regulation of economic activity. Corporate charters
commonly regulated the rates to be charged by incorporated ﬁrms, especially
for companies dealing in public utilities and infrastructure.24 Indeed, before
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Munn v. Illinois25 in 1877, it was unclear if
states even had authority to regulate unincorporated ﬁrms.26
The status of the corporation as a distinct locus for regulation was
consequential in diﬀerentiating the corporate legal regime from the one
applicable to natural persons and other organizational forms. On the one
hand, corporations were more likely to be regulated by the state both because
of explicit charter provisions and because incorporation provided authorities

liability permits the externalization of costs and is socially ineﬃcient); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 111 (1985) (arguing
that the asymmetrical costs and beneﬁts of absolute limited liability would lead to excessive risktaking by corporations).
23 It was not until 1837 that the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporate charter does not
necessarily imply a grant of monopoly privileges. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 420, 451 (1837). Moreover, entrepreneurs continued to seek special legislative charters for
purposes of obtaining explicit legal privileges long after general incorporation dispensing with state
approval became available. See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the
Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 143 (1985) (interpreting the continued supply
of special charters conferring legal privileges after the advent of general incorporation as a strategy
of market segmentation and price discrimination by rent-seeking legislatures).
24 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L. J.
1593, 1628-29 (1988) (“No pre-Civil War American classicist argued that rate regulation should be
administered by general statute rather than special charter.”).
25 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877) (“When . . . one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, he, in eﬀect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled
by the public for the common good . . . .”).
26 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 126 (1991).
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with more information about the ﬁrm’s existence and operations.27 On the
other hand, corporations often enjoyed monopoly rights and beneﬁted from
constitutional protection against subsequent state impingement on the rights
conferred by its charter.28 The special regulatory status of business
corporations vis-à-vis the state may well help explain the attractiveness of the
corporate form, even as the trust allowed entrepreneurs to obtain most
corporate attributes (such as lock-in, delegated management, and share
transferability) without the need for incorporation.29
However, as special charters granting corporate privileges fell out of favor
toward the end of the nineteenth century, the locus for state regulation and
protection shifted from the corporate charter to the general legal regime.
Three diﬀerent problems then emerged, giving rise to paradigmatic
challenges to regulatory partitioning. First, could corporations receive more
or less favorable regulatory treatment than natural persons or other
organizational forms? Second, when natural persons were subject to diﬀerent
regimes of legal rights or duties, to what extent would this special regime
transfer to business corporations those persons controlled? Third, when
would the law treat legal persons as truly separate from their members for
purposes of legal rights and duties?
II. THE ORIGINS OF VEIL PEEKING
Before examining the distinctive features and categories of veil peeking,
I will brieﬂy describe some of its early manifestations in the history of the
corporate form. The examples that follow are illustrative, rather than
exhaustive. They are meant to demonstrate the historical roots, operation,
and breadth of this phenomenon. I will then dissect its features and evaluate
its consequences.
27 See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the
State, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 112 (1983) (“By incorporating, a ﬁrm was eﬀectively announcing
its existence to the regulatory authorities, who would otherwise most probably have ignored it.”).
28 One reason why the limited partnership was less attractive than the corporate form in the
United States was that, in lacking a state-granted charter, it did not beneﬁt from constitutional
Contract Clause protection against subsequent regulation. Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1596. For
a discussion of constitutional Contract Clause protection as an instance of veil peeking, see infra
notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
29 See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American
Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2196-97 (2016) (describing the role of the trust as a
functional substitute for the corporation’s attributes but leaving open the reasons for seeking
incorporation). Interestingly, the trust itself also emerged in signiﬁcant part to help individuals
evade legal obligations vis-à-vis feudal authorities, such as death taxes and military obligations, by
manipulating the nexus for imputation. Id. at 2152 (“The trust helped a landowner avoid the feudal
incidents by allowing him to manipulate the way the law applied. Since the tax only applied to land
that a man owned in his own name at death, the tax did not apply if the land legally belonged to a
trustee . . . .”).
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The role of business organizations in segregating and abstracting a
shareholder’s legal status has a long historical pedigree. The concealment of
investor identity was central to the commenda business form of medieval citystates and the limited partnership (société en commandite simple) of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France, which are prominent precursors
of limited liability in commercial law.30 In a time of profound Christian
distaste for commerce and formal bans on its exercise by the nobility, these
forms permitted noblemen and magistrates to invest in business enterprise as
passive partners whose identities were hidden.31 This historical experience
illustrates that the concealment of shareholder identity and legal status—even
if in deliberate circumvention of existing laws or social norms—may well have
beneﬁcial economic eﬀects.32
If the use of business organizations for purposes of regulatory partitioning
has a long history, so does veil peeking. Veil peeking appears to have preceded
veil piercing, which should not be surprising given the relatively late
appearance of limited liability as a universal attribute of the corporate form
of organization.33 In the famous 1897 decision in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.,
the House of Lords vehemently declined to pierce the corporate veil and
overcome the protection of asset partitioning provided by the corporate
form.34 By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court engaged in veil peeking as early
as 1809 in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux.35
A. Early Constitutional Cases
The Deveaux case concerned a tax lawsuit brought by a Georgia tax
collector against the ﬁrst Bank of the United States.36 Created by the U.S.
government after much dispute over the existence of federal powers to charter
corporations, the Bank remained controversial and was resented by Thomas
Jeﬀerson and his allies in Georgia, who then sought to impose hefty taxes on
30 See Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the
American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511, 524-28 (2003) (arguing that limited liability in
this context was essentially a corollary of limited partners’ passivity and concealment).
31 Id.
32 Interestingly, since the enactment of the Commercial Code in 1807, the corporate form in
France is known as “anonymous company” (société anonyme), an expression that carried over to
French-, Spanish-, and Portuguese-speaking jurisdictions to this day. See Code de Commerce [C.
Com.] [Commercial Code] art. 29 (Fr.) (1807).
33 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960,
at 94 (1992) (“[T]ruly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even as late as
1900.”). California law did not provide for limited liability until 1931. Mark I. Weinstein, Share Price
Changes and the Arrival of Limited Liability in California, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2003).
34 Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 44, 51 (appeal taken from Eng.).
35 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 91-92 (1809).
36 For a description of the case and its background, see WINKLER, supra note 12, at 36-37.
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the institution.37 Seeking to avoid the likely prejudice of the Georgia
judiciary, the Bank ﬁled suit in federal court based on Article III, Section 2,
of the U.S. Constitution, which grants federal courts authority to decide
disputes “between Citizens of diﬀerent States.”38
In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[t]hat invisible, intangible, and
artiﬁcial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not
a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United
States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in
their corporate name.”39 The Court nevertheless engaged in veil peeking to
ﬁnd diversity of citizenship, refusing to declare that “the members of the
corporation were, to every intent and purpose, out of view, and merged in the
corporation.”40 It decided, instead, to “look to the character of the individuals
who compose the corporation,” who were citizens of Pennsylvania, thereby
authorizing federal diversity jurisdiction.41
Considering the facts before the Court, the decision in Deveaux may well
have been functional from a constitutional and corporate law perspective. It
avoided concerns about the partisanship of state courts that underlie the
constitutional provision for diversity jurisdiction, while in no way compromising
asset partitioning or other attributes of the corporate form. However, the
application of the broad method of veil peeking proposed by Deveaux to future
cases was clearly dysfunctional, leading to its eventual abandonment.
Given the requirement of complete diversity of citizenship, the presence of
a single director with the same citizenship as the counterparty was enough to
defeat the authority of federal courts. This criterion was therefore easily
manipulated, permitting corporations to avoid diversity jurisdiction through
opportunistic director appointments before the commencement of
litigation.42 Starting in 1844, the Supreme Court put an end to veil peeking
for jurisdictional purposes, instead relying on the state of incorporation for
the attribution of citizenship.43 Given its dysfunctionality in view of share
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86.
Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall, however, did not actually investigate the
Bank’s membership, which remained “abstract, undefined, and unexamined.” WINKLER, supra note 12, at 67.
42 See WINKLER, supra note 12, at 106-07 (“[W]hen railroads wanted to escape federal court
they would add a director from the same state as the plaintiﬀ, thus destroying the necessary diversity
of citizenship.”).
43 See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558
(1844) (“[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all
intents and purposes . . . an inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes of its incorporation,
capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person.”); Marshall v. Balt. &
Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328-29 (1853) (imposing a conclusive presumption that all
shareholders are citizens of the state of incorporation).
37
38
39
40
41
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tradability and the mutability of corporate directors, there seems to be no
other examples of veil peeking based on the identity of non-controlling
shareholders or of a singular corporate director.
Another early instance of veil peeking appeared a decade later in the
prominent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.44 The Court qualiﬁed the charter of Dartmouth College as a
contract between the donors, the trustees, and the state, holding subsequent
state laws impinging on charter provisions as an unconstitutional violation of
the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.45 The practical signiﬁcance of
the case, however, gradually declined with the rise of general incorporation
and the demise of special charters susceptible to being legally qualiﬁed as
contracts with the state.
B. Enemy Corporations in the World Wars
Wartime constraints also called into question the strict regime of
regulatory partitioning provided by the corporate form. While British courts
have been generally reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability
on shareholders,46 the House of Lords engaged in veil peeking as early as 1916
against the backdrop of World War I in Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and
Rubber Co. (Great Britain).47 The question in Daimler was whether a company
incorporated in England, but whose managers and virtually all of whose
shareholders were German and resided in Germany, qualiﬁed as an enemy
under existing trading prohibitions enacted during World War I.48 Citing
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Deveaux, the court found that it was
compatible with common law principles “to look, at least for some purposes,
behind the corporation and consider the quality of its members.”49
The Daimler opinion by Lord Parker of Waddington eﬀectively
distinguished between veil piercing and veil peeking without naming names.
It cited with approval the famous precedent of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.
for the proposition that a company legally incorporated is an independent
person with its own rights and liabilities.50 However, Lord Parker of
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Id. at 654 (“[I]n these private eleemosynary institutions, the body corporate, as possessing
the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely representing the donors, for the purpose of
executing the trust, has rights which are protected by the constitution.”).
46 Tan Cheng-Han, Jiangyu Wang & Christian Hoﬀmann, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Historical,
Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 140 (2019) (describing the cautious
approach to veil piercing in the United Kingdom).
47 [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
48 Id. at 308-09.
49 Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 338 (citing Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1896] AC 22 (HL) 30 (appeal taken from Eng.)).
44
45
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Waddington argued that “it is [not] a necessary corollary of this reasoning to
say that the character of its corporators must be irrelevant to the character of
the company; and this is crucial, for the rule against trading with the enemy
depends upon enemy character.”51 In making this distinction, Lord Parker
suggested that his veil peeking was justiﬁed, at least in part, by the case’s
wartime context.52
The Daimler opinion focused on reconciling the legal regimes governing
legal persons and natural persons, given that the latter could become enemies
by engaging in active aid or living in enemy territory.53 It held that, for an
artiﬁcial person, the analogue to voluntary residence in enemy territory was
to be found in corporate control.54 The court thus refused to permit
the paradoxical result that the King’s enemies, who chance during war to
constitute the entire body of corporators in a company registered in England,
thereby pass out of the range of legal vision, and, instead, the corporation, which
in itself is incapable of loyalty, or enmity, or residence, or of anything but
bare existence in contemplation of law and registration under some system of
law, takes their place for almost the most important of all purposes, that of
being classed among the King’s friends or among his foes in time of war.55

The United States initially followed a different approach to veil peeking in
wartime. The original Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 defined as an enemy
any corporation constituted in enemy territory or established in any country
other than the United States and doing business in enemy territory.56 The U.S.
Supreme Court reasoned that this statutory language was deliberately
“considered in the light of difficulties certain to follow disregard of corporate
identity and efforts to fix the status of corporations as enemy or not according
to the nationality of stockholders.”57 Because the statutory language specifically
addressed enemy corporations and appeared to preclude the Daimler solution,
the Court therefore permitted regulatory partitioning and refused to attribute
enemy character to corporations in view of enemy ownership.58
Congress would eventually amend the Act in 1947 to provide for
legislative veil peeking by imputing enemy character to corporations that
Id.
See id. at 344 (“[T]he truth is that considerations which govern civil liability and rights of
property in time of peace diﬀer radically from those which govern enemy character in time of war.”).
53 See id. at 339 (describing how a natural person can take on “enemy character”).
54 See id. at 340 (describing how an artiﬁcial person can adopt enemy character through the
“acts of a company’s organs”).
55 Id. (emphasis added).
56 See Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457, 463 (1925) (quoting Trading with the Enemy
Act, ch. 106, § 2(a), 40 Stat. 411, 411 (1917) (codiﬁed at 50 U.S.C. § 4302(a)).
57 Id. at 472.
58 Id. at 472-73.
51
52
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were at least ﬁfty percent owned or controlled by enemies.59 However, a
diﬀerent veil peeking question also emerged. Should courts engage in reverse
veil peeking60 to protect the rights of innocent (non-enemy) shareholders in
an enemy corporation whose assets were seized? In a split decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court answered in the aﬃrmative “not based on any technical
concept of derivative rights appropriate to the law of corporations,” but
“based on the [Trading with the Enemy] Act which enables one not an enemy
as deﬁned in § 2 to recover any interest, right or title which he has in the
property vested.”61 The dissenting opinion by Justice Reed, in turn,
denounced the majority’s “disregard of the ordinary incidents of the relation
of a stockholder to a corporation,” for “[a] stockholder has no present interest
in the physical property of an unliquidated corporation.”62
Beyond the early constitutional law and wartime cases, most of the early
veil peeking controversies dealt with blunt attempts at regulatory arbitrage,
with parties invoking regulatory partitioning to circumvent certain legal
restrictions, as examined below.
C. Early Antitrust and Regulatory Enforcement
Early antitrust cases produced some of the most conspicuous instances of
veil peeking as a response to regulatory arbitrage. Take the prominent
precedent of State v. Standard Oil, decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
1892.63 In that lawsuit, the state attorney general sought to dissolve the
Standard Oil Company of Ohio for abusing its franchise in entering into and
performing a monopolistic trust agreement against public policy.64 The
Standard Oil Trust was constituted in 1882 to own and control the stocks of
forty separate competing companies for the beneﬁt of the shareholders of the
Standard Oil Company of Ohio.65 By 1892, the Standard Oil Trust held the
stocks of eighty-four companies.66 However, the parties to the trust
agreement were the shareholders of the companies involved and not the
companies themselves.67

59 Act of Aug. 5, 1947, ch. 499, sec. 2, § 32(a)(2), 61 Stat. 784, 784-85 (codiﬁed at 50 U.S.C.
§ 4329(a)(2)(E)).
60 See infra Part III (describing reverse veil peeking).
61 Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 343 U.S. 156, 160 (1952); see also Trading with the Enemy
Act, ch. 106, § 2, 40 Stat. 411, 411 (1917) (codiﬁed at 50 U.S.C. § 4302).
62 Kaufman, 343 U.S. at 166 (Reed, J., dissenting).
63 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892).
64 Id. at 279.
65 H. L. Wilgus, The Standard Oil Decision; The Rule of Reason, 8 MICH. L. REV. 643, 648 (1911).
66 Id.
67 Standard Oil, 30 N.E. at 280.
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This raised the question of whether the shareholders’ execution of the
unlawful trust agreement could be attributed to Standard Oil of Ohio to
punish the company for its unlawfulness.68 Answering in the aﬃrmative, the
Ohio Supreme Court maintained that corporate separateness, while a useful
ﬁction for purposes of asset partitioning and contracting, should be
disregarded when used for other purposes.69 The court held that
where all, or a majority, of the stockholders comprising a corporation do an
act which is designed to aﬀect the property and business of the company . . .
and the act so done is ultra vires of the corporation and against public policy,
and was done by them in their individual capacity for the purpose of concealing
their real purpose and object, the act should be regarded as the act of the
corporation; and, to prevent the abuse of corporate power, may be challenged
as such by the state . . . .70

While the court found that the forfeiture of Standard Oil’s Ohio charter
was barred by the statute of limitations,71 it engaged in veil peeking to prevent
the company from making and performing the trust agreement. The Standard
Oil Trust was then liquidated and the shares were transferred back to the
several companies, which were later regrouped as the Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey, a holding company formed under New Jersey’s new liberal
corporation law.72 It took the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil

68 In Justice Minshall’s words, “the real question we are now to determine is whether . . . the
execution of the agreement set forth in the petition should be imputed to the association of persons
constituting the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, acting in their corporate capacity.” Id. at 288.
69 As the Standard Oil court stated:

The general proposition that a corporation is to be regarded as a legal entity, existing
separate and apart from the natural persons composing it, is not disputed; but that the
statement is a mere ﬁction, existing only in idea, is well understood, and not
controverted by any one who pretends to accurate knowledge on the subject. It has
been introduced for the convenience of the company in making contracts, in acquiring
property for corporate purposes, in suing and being sued, and to preserve the limited liability of
the stockholders by distinguishing between the corporate debts and property of the company and
of the stockholders in their capacity as individuals. All ﬁctions of law have been introduced
for the purpose of convenience, and to subserve the ends of justice . . . . But when they
are urged to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of the ﬁction, they
have always been disregarded by the courts.
Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 289-90. (second emphasis added).
71 Id. at 291.
72 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 38-42 (1911) (describing how,
following the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision, Ohio instituted contempt proceedings against the
Standard Oil Trust for failing to dissolve, only after which the several companies reorganized under
a holding corporation in New Jersey).
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Co. of New Jersey v. United States in 1910, applying the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890, to ultimately break up Standard Oil.73
The Ohio Standard Oil decision was not unique in mitigating regulatory
partitioning to ensure the enforcement of competition laws. Two years
before, New York had also sought to dissolve a company based on illegal trust
agreements signed by its members. In the leading case of People v. North River
Sugar Refining Co.,74 the New York Court of Appeals decided to “look beneath
[the entity] at the actions of the individuals upon whom the franchise was
conferred” in view of attributing such action to the company.75 These early
cases are emblematic of the great willingness to look behind the corporate
veil in the antitrust context—a trend that would prove lasting.76
Early courts also engaged in veil peeking to punish dummy corporations
created to evade rate regulations. In United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co., defendants formed a corporation to conceal their receipt of
rebates in violation of the rate regulations in the form of rate discrimination
against other shippers.77 The court found the argument that the corporation
in question was a separate legal person for purposes of the regulations
“neither new, nor deserving of new success,”78 holding, as described by
Maurice Wormser, that “people cannot obtain legal immunity for deliberate
wrongdoing by a resort to the ‘entity bath.’”79
D. Jim Crow Discrimination
The segregationist laws of the Jim Crow era provide a blatant example of
discriminatory legal treatment across natural persons. In this context, formal
incorporation by Black corporators as a separate legal person could oﬀer
regulatory partitioning, and thereby help circumvent some of these odious
restrictions. The case of People’s Pleasure Park Co. v. Rohleder involves precisely
this scenario, in which Major Joseph B. Johnson, who had formerly been
enslaved, formed a business corporation to avoid the application of a
restrictive covenant barring the transfer of property to “colored persons.”80
Despite the obvious attempt to use the corporate form for evading legal
Id. at 79.
24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890).
Wormser, supra note 12, at 510.
See infra Section VI.B.
See United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 250 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
Id. at 256.
Wormser, supra note 12, at 508. As described by Elvin Latty, the court “d[id] not say that a
corporation is a separate entity—that the stockholders are shut oﬀ from legal view” in this particular
context. Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REV. 597, 602 (1936).
80 61 S.E. 794, 795-96 (Va. 1908). For an extensive discussion of the case, see Richard R.W.
Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023 (2006).
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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constraints, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declined to engage in veil
peeking and did not attribute Johnson’s race to the company. Instead, it held
that “in law, there can be no such thing as a colored corporation.”81
In embracing a strict approach of regulatory partitioning by declining to
attribute a racial identity to the corporation, the People’s Pleasure Park decision
had the beneﬁts of promoting the civil rights of shareholders and reducing
the monitoring costs of the corporation’s creditors.82 However, Richard
Brooks posited that perhaps the fundamental reason why the court refused to
attribute race to legal person was that “[d]oing so would have revealed the
unadorned legal construction of race and undermined the political and social
regime of that period.”83
Whatever the real reasons for the People’s Pleasure Park decision, the
“fancied compulsion of the entity concept” is probably not the most
persuasive.84 At any rate, while veil-peeking claims would continue to appear
in the context of race-based laws, courts subsequently departed from the strict
adoption of regulatory partitioning in People’s Pleasure Park.85
III. VEIL PEEKING VS. VEIL PIERCING
Before proceeding to examine the economic role of regulatory
partitioning and its exceptions, as well as the prevalence and range of veil
peeking claims in contemporary law, I conceptualize and categorize the key
structural properties of veil peeking. Up until now, scholarly works and
judicial opinions have consistently conﬂated veil piercing and veil peeking.86
Studies focusing on limited liability commonly cite veil peeking precedents
without ever acknowledging that they do not aﬀect shareholder liability.87
Existing mentions of the diﬀerent exceptions to corporate separateness
are few, perfunctory, and untheorized, which likely helps to explain their

Brooks, supra note 80, at 2024 (citation omitted).
See id. at 2046-47 (describing how racializing the corporation would expose “Black”
corporations and their creditors to greater liability, and how potential creditors would have had to incur
additional expenses to determine how corporations would be racialized before contracting with them).
83 Id. at 2047.
84 See Latty, supra note 79, at 609-10 (arguing that the decision in People’s Pleasure Park should
have been based on the invalidity of racial covenants, rather than the strict regulatory partitioning
adopted by the court).
85 See infra Section VI.A.
86 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Some decisions, however, make implicit distinctions
between these modalities. See, e.g., supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 190-91 (2016) (examining the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006), as a case about reverse veil piercing). For my
analysis of this case as one of veil peeking, see infra Section VI.0.
81
82
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limited impact.88 German scholarship (and international scholarship building
on German scholarship)89 oﬀers diﬀerent labels for the “penetration” of the
corporate veil for purposes of imposing liability on shareholders
(Haftungsdurchgriﬀ) and of attributing certain legal characteristics of
shareholders to the corporation (Zurechnungsdurchgriﬀ), but it does not
articulate diﬀerent grounds for, or implications of, these separate categories.90
A few decisions by U.K. courts in the 1990s have similarly distinguished
between “piercing the corporate veil” for purposes of liability and “lifting the
corporate veil” for other legal purposes,91 though this distinction also failed
to take oﬀ.92 Israel’s Companies Law provides the exception that proves the
rule. While Section 6(a) of the Israeli statute requires fraud or subversion of
the company’s purpose for the imposition of liability on shareholders (asset
departitioning), Section 6(b) permits courts to ascribe attributes, rights, or
obligations of shareholders to the company or vice-versa (regulatory
departitioning) “if it is just and right to do so, having taken into account the
intention of the statute or of the agreement that applies to the matter before it.”93
Yet, despite the prevailing doctrinal confusion in most jurisdictions, the
diﬀerences between veil piercing and veil peeking are clear and numerous.
This Part endeavors to map these diﬀerences and ﬁll the existing gap.

88 For an interesting Italian monograph covering certain manifestations of what the author
calls “the external relevance of shareholders,” see ALBERTO MUSSO, LA RILEVANZA ESTERNA DEL
SOCIO NELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI (1996).
89 See, e.g., CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O NOVO DIREITO SOCIETÁRIO 259-60 (2011); 2
JORGE MANUEL COUTINHO DE ABREU, CURSO DE DIREITO COMERCIAL: DAS SOCIEDADES
174-76 (6th ed. 2019).
90 The concept of Zurechnungsdurchgriff is similar, though not identical, to the concept of veil
peeking used here. The distinction between “liability penetration” (Haftungsdurchgriff) and “imputation
penetration” (Zurechnungsdurchgriff) comes from the work of prominent German corporate law scholar
HERBERT WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT: EIN LEHRBUCH DES UNTERNEHMENS- UND
VERBANDSRECHTS (1980). Although pioneering and highly illuminating in labeling the different
types of exceptions to corporate separateness, Wiedemann’s useful categorization has had limited
impact on legal scholarship and practice, both in Germany and internationally.
91 For example, one Justice of the Court of Appeal wrote that

[l]ike all metaphors, this phrase [the corporate veil] can sometimes obscure reasoning
rather than elucidate it. There are, I think, two senses in which it is used, which need
to be distinguished. To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve
for treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities
or activities of its shareholders. To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the other
hand, should mean to have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.
Atlas Mar. Co. SA v. Avalon Mar. Ltd. [1990] 4 All ER 769 (AC) at 779 (Staughton LJ).
92 See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception, 56
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284 n.2 (1997) (using lifting the corporate veil as a synonym of piercing the
corporate veil as an exception to limited liability).
93 Companies Law, 5759–1999, reprinted in COMPANIES LAW 5759-1999 (Aryeh Greenﬁeld
trans., A.G. Publications 9th ed. 2015).
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A. Directional and Structural Diﬀerence
As depicted in Figure 1 below, there is a directional and structural
diﬀerence in the operation of veil piercing and veil peeking. Veil piercing
overcomes limited liability to allow corporate creditors to reach shareholders’
assets. Reverse veil piercing, which is rarer, overcomes entity shielding by
allowing shareholders’ creditors to reach the corporation’s assets.
Veil peeking, in turn, serves to impute certain legal rights or duties of
shareholders to the corporation. Reverse veil peeking imputes certain rights
or features of the corporation to its shareholders, who are allowed to claim
them in their own name.94 Examples of reverse veil peeking are given by
corporate law rules requiring the parent company’s shareholders to approve a
substantial sale of assets by a subsidiary,95 and the international investment
law regime permitting foreign shareholders to sue host states for the reﬂective
losses they suﬀered due to unfair or inequitable treatment of the
corporation.96

94 Scholars have implicitly noted this directional diﬀerence. See Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at
17 (discussing “reverse piercing” by corporate insiders).
95 See infra notes 303–303 and accompanying text.
96 See infra Section VI.C.
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Figure 1: Directional Diﬀerences Between Veil Piercing and Veil Peeking
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B. Distributional and Ideological Implications
Veil piercing and veil peeking diﬀer in their distributional implications
and ideological connotations. Veil piercing has invariably anti-shareholder
and pro-regulatory consequences, granting creditors remedies that exceed
those expressly bargained for or imposing liabilities (such as for torts or
regulatory violations) that were not consensually assumed. Veil peeking, by
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contrast, may be pro- or anti-shareholder, as well as pro- or anti-regulation,
depending on whether one looks behind the corporate veil to impute legal
advantages or detriments to the corporation.
Veil peeking can be used to level the legal playing ﬁeld in ways that are
beneﬁcial or detrimental to shareholder interests compared to the baseline of
absolute regulatory partitioning. Shareholders may beneﬁt from the
attribution of free speech, religious, and due process rights to corporations
on a pass-through basis, all of which can have the eﬀect of frustrating the
state’s regulatory eﬀorts.97 However, veil peeking can also hurt shareholder
interests and boost regulation by foreclosing the use of the corporate form to
evade legal mandates or an unfavorable regulatory regime.
C. Frequency of Application
Although veil peeking problems are more circumscribed, they seem to be
more easily accepted than veil piercing claims. Even jurisdictions that are
reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on shareholders, such
as the United Kingdom, have engaged in veil peeking with some frequency.98
The greater palatability of veil peeking would not be surprising given the
nature of the constitutional and regulatory interests involved, as analyzed
next, as well as the diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts of asset and regulatory
partitioning, as examined in Part V below.
D. Areas of Law
There is a likely diﬀerence in the ﬁelds of law giving rise to most veil
piercing and veil peeking claims. Veil piercing claims seem to be more
common in private law disputes concerning contract and tort law claims,
while veil peeking cases frequently appear in public law cases testing the
permissibility of legal discrimination by the state, or tackling parties’
97 Admittedly, the attribution of free speech and religious rights to corporations may increase
agency costs between shareholders and managers (or among shareholders) having diﬀerent views of
beliefs. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
98 In fact, the recent reconceptualization of veil piercing by the U.K. Supreme Court is in large
part about veil peeking. According to the court, the U.K. jurisprudence on veil piercing can be
explained in terms of what Lord Sumption termed the “concealment principle” and the “evasion
principle,” both of which are often about peeking, not piercing. Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd. [2013]
UKSC 34, [28] (Lord Sumption SCJ) (appeal taken from Eng.). The United Kingdom is also a
leader in the global movement toward public disclosure of beneﬁcial ownership, which supports veil
peeking as well as veil piercing. See JOHN GITHONGO, BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: THE GLOBAL
STATE
OF
PLAY
2019,
at
3-4
(2019),
https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/beneﬁcial_ownership_githongo_ﬁnal_july_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Y3G-3U63] (describing a 2009 scandal in Britain and subsequent initiatives by
the British government to increase ownership transparency).
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attempts at regulatory arbitrage, often emerging in constitutional, antitrust,
regulatory, tax, or international law disputes.
Nevertheless, the correlation between veil piercing and veil peeking and
areas of private and public law is far from absolute. Numerous public law
rules and regulations are enforced by ﬁnancial penalties to be satisﬁed against
an entity’s assets. Veil piercing as an exception to asset partitioning can and
does often appear in connection with regulatory claims and criminal law, as
when the state goes after the assets of a parent company to sanction violations
of environmental laws by a subsidiary.99 Conversely, as further illustrated
below, veil peeking also applies in private law as a gap-ﬁlling method to avoid
the circumvention of contract, property, and corporate law rules.
E. Diﬀerent Boundaries
As diﬀerent functional phenomena, veil piercing and veil peeking are
subject to distinct boundaries. Regulatory partitioning itself is also subject to
diﬀerent boundaries across legal ﬁelds and rules, a phenomenon that also
holds to a lesser extent for asset partitioning. This means that the imposition
of liability on corporate shareholders in a given veil piercing case does not
necessarily put an end to regulatory partitioning (or asset partitioning, for
that matter) in other areas of law, such as tax and jurisdictional matters.
Conversely, the use of veil peeking in a certain regulatory context does not
compromise asset partitioning or regulatory partitioning across the board.
Furthermore, contrary to existing assumptions, there appears to be no
necessary correlation between courts’ general willingness to engage in veil
piercing and veil peeking.100 Veil piercing and veil peeking provide exceptions
to distinct components of corporate separateness and are treated differently by
courts. If anything, there might be a reverse relationship between a given court’s
willingness to engage in veil piercing and shareholder-friendly veil peeking.
U.S. courts have repeatedly engaged in veil peeking to attribute
constitutional rights to corporations but generally have been reluctant to
impinge on limited liability by piercing the corporate veil. Commentators
have pointed to a contradiction in this approach,101 but the tension is only
apparent. The reluctance to engage in veil piercing and the willingness to
99 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 1058 n.117 (describing the incidence of veil piercing in the
context of criminal law and regulatory law); Macey & Mitts, supra note 4, at 115 (ﬁnding that veil
piercing is particularly common to uphold the purpose of a regulatory or statutory scheme, as when
courts impose liabilities on parent companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)).
100 Some commentators have posited such a connection. Macey & Strine, supra note 14, at 42
(warning about the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court veil peeking decision in Citizens United
for the concept of limited liability).
101 See, e.g., id.
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engage in veil peeking to attribute shareholder rights to the corporation are
consistent in their pro-shareholder and anti-regulatory orientation.
Contrast this to Brazilian law, which has adopted an exceptionally
expansive approach to veil piercing, eﬀectively eliminating the protection of
limited liability with respect to labor, environmental, and consumer claims.102
At the same time, the Brazilian Supreme Court has been reluctant to attribute
constitutional rights to corporations through veil peeking. In 2015, it found
that the existing statute permitting campaign contributions from legal
persons was unconstitutional as a violation of the general principles of
equality and democracy.103 This decision stands in contrast to the U.S.
Supreme Court stance in Citizens United v. FEC,104 which recognizes
corporations’ free speech rights to make independent campaign expenditures.
IV. UNPACKING VEIL PEEKING
This Part scrutinizes the diﬀerent forms of veil peeking by mapping out
the main functions performed by veil peeking and oﬀering a taxonomy of its
diﬀerent modalities. This eﬀort will reveal that, although suﬃciently
distinctive as a category, veil peeking is not a unitary phenomenon. This
categorization of diﬀerent veil peeking strategies will have repercussions for
the economic analysis of regulatory partitioning and veil peeking, as
presented in the following section.
A. The Types of Veil Peeking Problems
Veil peeking questions concern one of three related problems:
1. The Problem of Permissible Regulatory Diﬀerentiation
The question here is whether individuals and legal persons (or diﬀerent
types of legal persons) ought to be subject to the same or diﬀerent legal
regime. Prominent examples include the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, which is credited for
concluding that the disparate tax treatment aﬀorded to railroad corporations
102 Mariana Pargendler, How Universal Is the Corporate Form? Reflections on the Dwindling of
Corporate Attributes in Brazil, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 (2019).
103 S.T.F., Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 4.650, Realtor: Min. Luiz Fux, 17.09.2015,
http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/downloadPeca.asp?id=308746530&ext=.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEQ5M9B6]. The Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) decision concerns campaign contributions rather than
independent political expenditures as does Citizens United. In fact, the STF opinion mentions
Citizens United but distinguishes its decision by referring to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424. U.S. 1, 22 (1976), which diﬀerentiates the protection of campaign contribution
and political expenditures on First Amendment grounds.
104 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
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in California compared to individual landowners violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,105 and
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
which held the corporate identity of the speaker did not aﬀect its protection
under the First Amendment.106
2. The Problem of Permissible Regulatory Arbitrage
The issue here pertains to the legality of using the corporate form to evade
or modify existing legal restrictions. Examples include the formation of a
corporation by a Black founder to evade the racial covenants in People
Pleasure’s Park,107 the transfer of real property to a wholly owned corporation
to avoid homestead exemptions against creditors,108 and the incorporation in
a foreign jurisdiction covered by a bilateral investment treaty to obtain
enhanced legal protection against one’s home state.109
3. The Problem of Aggregation and Pass-Through Imputation
This problem concerns whether and how certain rights, duties or qualities
of shareholders that are subject to disparate legal treatment should be
imputed to the legal persons owned or controlled by them. Examples include
the imputation of enemy character of shareholders or managers to the
corporation for purposes of the application of wartime restrictions.110
Although analytically distinct, these problems are interrelated. While the
ﬁrst problem relates to the permissibility of regulatory diﬀerentiation, the
latter two emerge only when the legal regime eﬀectively distinguishes
between the legal status of diﬀerent natural persons, of natural persons and
legal persons, or of diﬀerent legal persons. Regulatory arbitrage always
presupposes the existence of regulatory diﬀerentiation. Pass-through
imputation at times presupposes the existence of regulatory diﬀerentiation
and at times determines whether such regulatory diﬀerentiation is
permissible.

105 118 U.S. 394, 394-95 (1886). But see infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text (for the
controversy surrounding the holding of Santa Clara due to the misleading syllabus).
106 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). While veil peeking often pertains to the problem of permissible
regulatory diﬀerentiation across diﬀerent organizational forms, not all questions of regulatory
diﬀerentiation concern veil peeking. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405, 1408
(2018) (holding that, unlike foreign individuals, foreign corporations may not be sued under the
Alien Tort Statute in the absence of clear congressional instructions).
107 See supra Section II.D.
108 See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
109 See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
110 See supra Section II.B.

744

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 717

B. A Taxonomy of Veil Peeking
For each of the problems outlined above, there can be diﬀerent forms of
veil peeking or regulatory partitioning responses.
1. Explicit Veil Peeking by Lawmakers vs. Judicial Veil Peeking as Gap
Filling
The ﬁrst and most fundamental distinction concerns the source of veil
peeking. Veil peeking may be the result of the explicit language of the
constitution, statute, treaty, or contract in question (lawmaker veil peeking),
or it might be the product of a judicial determination when the legal source
in question does not provide an explicit solution for the classical veil-peeking
problems (judicial veil peeking). Explicit veil peeking by lawmakers is
commonplace. A few examples include tax rules that condition the applicable
regime on the identity of shareholders in the corporation, the corporate law
requirement that shareholders of the parent company approve asset sales
conducted by a subsidiary, and the statutory imposition of enemy treatment
on corporations that are ﬁfty percent enemy owned or controlled under the
amended Trading with the Enemy Act.111
Most veil peeking controversies, however, relate to situations in which the
legal text in question is not explicit about (1) the permissibility of regulatory
diﬀerentiation, (2) the permissibility of regulatory arbitrage, or (3) the
criterion for aggregation or pass-through imputation. This means that veilpeeking controversies, including the ones examined here, are essentially about
interpretation or gap ﬁlling of constitutional, statutory, treaty, or contractual
texts that do not explicitly address the treatment of corporate entities. As a
question of constitutional, statutory, treaty, or contractual construction, the
standard tenets of interpretation apply, and the purpose of the regulatory
scheme in question assumes major importance.
2. Shareholder-Friendly vs. Shareholder-Unfriendly Veil Peeking
Veil peeking can also be categorized according to its eﬀects. Shareholderfriendly veil peeking restricts the scope of government intervention on
corporations by permitting the assertion of shareholder rights against the
state. Shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking magniﬁes the regulatory power of
the state over business corporations by preventing regulatory arbitrage, or
ascribing to corporations some of the regulatory constraints applicable to the
individuals that control them.

111

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Shareholder-friendly veil peeking increases the attractiveness of the
corporate form, while shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking reduces it.
Shareholder-friendly veil peeking generally limits the state’s power, and
shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking generally augments it. There are,
however, exceptions to this pattern. The opposite result holds when the state
itself is a shareholder—as in a citizen’s free-speech lawsuit against
government-owned railroad company Amtrak112—so that shareholderunfriendly veil peeking reduces state power, but also decreases the
attractiveness of the corporate form to the state. The use of veil peeking to
permit corporations to raise antidiscrimination claims, as examined below,
simultaneously enhances the state’s regulatory power and favors shareholder
interests, thereby increasing the attractiveness of the corporate form.
Indeed, both veil peeking and the strict upholding of regulatory
partitioning can promote shareholder-friendly and shareholder-unfriendly
outcomes, depending on the question at issue. Take, for instance, the
interaction between race and regulatory partitioning. The strict regulatory
partitioning commitment to “colorless corporations” in the face of racial
covenants was clearly shareholder friendly,113 as is the veil peeking approach
permitting corporations to claim a racial identity for the purposes of
antidiscrimination laws.114
3. Untailored (Categorical) vs. Tailored Veil Peeking
Veil peeking can be implemented in a categorical or tailored fashion.115
Veil peeking is categorical when the relevant decision about regulatory
partitioning is made without regard to the characteristics of the corporation
in question. Tailored veil peeking occurs when the imputation of rights or
characteristics to the corporation takes into account the particular ownership
structure of the corporation or other case-speciﬁc factors. Tailored approaches
to veil peeking can take place through legal rules (e.g., depending on nonproﬁt vs. for-proﬁt status or the ownership of a certain percentage of voting
shares) or standards (such as the existence of corporate control). In the choice

See infra notes 283–87 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
See infra Section V.0.
This categorization draws loosely on Ayres and Gertner’s seminal work on default rules in
contract law, which distinguishes between “tailored” defaults (which aims to apply the rule that the
parties before the court would have wanted), “untailored” defaults (which applies the regime that
most parties would have wanted), and “penalty” default rules (which provide a regime that the
parties would not have contracted for). See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
112
113
114
115
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between rule-based or standard-based tailoring, the familiar tradeoﬀs
between rules and standards apply.116
The famous syllabus of Santa Clara, stating that corporations are persons
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment as a form of protection for the
rights of individuals, is an instance of categorical veil peeking.117 So is the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Copperweld holding that a parent and a
wholly owned subsidiary do not count as separate entities for purposes of a
conspiracy under the Sherman Act.118 Although the categorical recognition of
regulatory partitioning is well known—as in the commitment to “colorless
corporations” in People’s Pleasure Park119—or in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
refusal to extend the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
to corporations120—scholars, practitioners, and courts often do not appreciate
the broad use of categorical veil peeking.121
A key question in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson122 was whether a company indirectly owned by the Israeli
government through intermediate corporate entities qualiﬁed as an
instrumentality of the state for purpose of federal jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The FSIA grants
instrumentality status to an entity “a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof.”123 In declining to ﬁnd federal jurisdiction, the unanimous opinion,
written by Justice Kennedy, noted that “[t]he doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil . . . is the rare exception, applied in the case of fraud or certain
exceptional circumstances” and “usually determined on a case-by-case
basis.”124 It added that the companies had “no authority for extending the
doctrine so far that, as a categorical matter, all subsidiaries are deemed to be
the same as the parent corporation.”125 Yet the very jurisprudence of the

116 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557
(1992) (explaining how legal rules are more costly to create while standards are more costly to
interpret); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592 (1988)
(distinguishing rules from standards by describing how rules allow malicious actors to act within the
acceptable yet harmful limits on their conduct).
117 See infra notes 251–53 and accompanying text.
118 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777; see also infra Section VI.0.
119 See supra Section II.D.
120 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 57 (1906).
121 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 12, at 1200 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s attribution of
shareholders’ constitutional rights to corporations as “a radical departure from the Court’s treatment
of corporations in all other areas of law”).
122 538 U.S. 468, 471 (2003).
123 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
124 Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 475.
125 Id. at 475-76 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court recognizes several instances of categorical veil peeking in
other contexts.126
Conversely, factual inquiries into control structures in Daimler and Standard
Oil of Ohio reflect a tailored approach to veil peeking. However, the distinction
between tailored and untailored approaches to veil peeking do not represent a
sharp dichotomy, but rather a continuum of approaches that are more or less
tailored. This is well illustrated by the analysis of the prominent (if
controversial) decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC.127
In that case, Citizens United, a nonproﬁt corporation, sought to release
and publicize a documentary critical of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
through video-on-demand.128 The issue was whether a federal statutory rule
prohibiting unions and corporations from making certain political
expenditures constituted a violation of the guarantee of freedom of speech
contained in the First Amendment of the Constitution.129
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion deemed the statutory restrictions
unconstitutional based on (1) the unconstitutionality of restrictions based on
the identity of the speaker, as the text of the First Amendment refers to
“speech,”130 and (2) the pass-through imputation on a categorical basis of
citizens’ rights to corporations, which are described as “associations of
citizens.”131 In my taxonomy, the Court’s majority opinion engages in judicial
gap ﬁlling to embrace shareholder-friendly veil peeking on a categorical basis,
thereby forbidding regulatory diﬀerentiation to the detriment of corporations
as a whole.132
The dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, by contrast, sought to sanction
regulatory diﬀerentiation between the rights of humans and artiﬁcial entities
by preserving regulatory partitioning.133 It endorsed the diﬀerent treatment
126 See, e.g., supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text; infra note 251 and accompanying text
(presenting examples of court cases in which the Supreme Court employed a categorical approach
to veil peeking).
127 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
128 Id. at 319-20.
129 Id. at 321.
130 See id. at 341 (“The First Amendment protects speech and the speaker, and the ideas that
ﬂow from each.”).
131 Id. at 356
132 As one scholar described it, “[t]he change [in Citizens United] was that the Court rejected
the taxonomy-based approach distinguishing among organizations” and “abandoned the nuanced
approach involving the application of narrow tailoring and compelling state interest law that had
developed over the prior decades.” Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 118 (2014).
133 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Unlike our colleagues, [the Framers] had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human
beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was
the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.”).
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of corporate political expenditures given that “[i]n the context of election to
public oﬃce, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is
signiﬁcant.”134 Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Citizens
United are categorical in that they do not condition veil peeking or regulatory
partitioning on the particular characteristics of the legal person in question,
in terms of ownership structure or for-proﬁt versus non-proﬁt status, among
other factors.
Scholars such as Margaret Blair and Elizabeth Pollman have advocated
precisely such a tailored peeking approach that distinguishes between
organizational forms of for-proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt corporations, as well as
between ﬁrms with diﬀerent ownership structures.135 In defending such a
tailored approach, they suggest that, in view of the derivative nature of
corporate constitutional rights, it is imperative “to identify the speciﬁc group
of natural persons from whom the corporate right is derived,” so that
categorical, “[b]road rulings as to all corporations do not suﬃce.”136 Despite
certain potential advantages, however, such a tailored veil-peeking approach
generates obvious diﬃculties of line drawing, as its supporters concede.137
In any case, the distinction between tailored and categorical approaches
to veil peeking is not rigidly binary, but rather part of a spectrum. Even the
majority opinion in Citizens United acknowledged the potential need for
subsequent tailoring of veil peeking to constrain foreign interference in
elections.138 It refused, however, to categorically embrace regulatory

Garrett, supra note 132, at 118.
Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1733 (2015) (“[F]or some purposes, some corporations can usefully
and functionally be regarded as aggregates of their members from whom rights could be derived,
while other corporations serve other purposes, and cannot be regarded as representing any particular
natural person or group of natural persons.”).
136 Id. at 1735.
137 See id. at 1738; see also Elizabeth Pollman, Line Drawing in Corporate Rights Determinations,
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 597, 600-02 (2016) (discussing why the diversity in corporate organizations is
grounds for a tailored approach to determining corporate rights); Margaret M. Blair, Corporations
and Expressive Rights: How the Lines Should Be Drawn, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 253-54 (2016)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should clearly deﬁne corporate rights for speciﬁc types of
organizations).
138 Justice Kennedy wrote:
134
135

We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling interest in
preventing foreign individuals or associations from inﬂuencing our Nation’s political
process . . . . Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we assumed, arguendo,
that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting foreign inﬂuence over our
political process.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1046 (suggesting that future eﬀorts to regulate campaign expenditures by
foreign corporations will likely rely on the locus of corporate management control, rather than on
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partitioning as a solution to this problem, as proposed by Justice Stevens in
his dissenting opinion.139
V. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY PARTITIONING AND
VEIL PEEKING
Asset (de)partitioning and regulatory (de)partitioning serve
fundamentally diﬀerent functions and entail distinct tradeoﬀs. While the
literature provides ready answers regarding the economic properties of asset
partitioning and veil piercing, it has thus far ignored the role of regulatory
partitioning and veil peeking. Up until now, regulatory partitioning had not
been explicitly identiﬁed, much less theorized. This Part ﬁrst examines the
economic beneﬁts and costs of regulatory partitioning and how they diﬀer
from those of asset partitioning. It then oﬀers guidance to courts in
adjudicating veil peeking controversies.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Asset and Regulatory (De)partitioning
Asset partitioning in the form of limited liability and entity shielding
oﬀers several beneﬁts, which veil piercing and reverse veil piercing then
potentially compromise. By limiting shareholders’ economic exposure,
limited liability (1) reduces monitoring costs of shareholders and creditors,
(2) encourages delegated management and thereby promotes diversiﬁcation,
and (3) facilitates share tradability, liquidity, and the market for corporate
control by permitting shares to be priced irrespective of the identity of their
owners. Entity shielding, which is compromised by reverse veil piercing,
helps (4) preserve going concern value, (5) facilitate bankruptcy
administration, and (6) correct debt overhang. At the same time, however,
asset partitioning produces two new forms of costs: (1) an increased agency
cost of debt and (2) higher accounting costs.140
the nationality of the majority of shareholders, for “the same reasons that forced the Court to
abandon the aggregate view for diversity jurisdiction”).
139 Justice Stevens wrote:
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the identity of a speaker has no
relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political speech would lead to some
remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have accorded the propaganda
broadcasts to our troops by “Tokyo Rose” during World War II the same protection
as speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would appear to aﬀord the same
protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “‘enhance the relative voice’” of some (i.
e., humans) over others (i. e., nonhumans).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id.
at 379-80 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
140 See Hansmann & Squire, supra note 2, at 266 tbl. 11.1.
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Compared to veil piercing, veil peeking compromises only a fraction of
the beneﬁts of asset partitioning listed above and, even so, only to a limited
extent. Because veil piercing does not inﬂuence asset partitioning, it does not
at all aﬀect going concern value, the ease of bankruptcy administration, and
the solutions to debt overhang as important advantages of asset partitioning.
Nor does it mitigate, for that matter, the costs of asset partitioning.
Regulatory partitioning does share with asset partitioning the key beneﬁt
of promoting share transferability, liquidity, and the market for corporate
control. By isolating the legal regime applicable to the corporation from the
identity and regulatory status of its shareholders, it permits corporations to
be valued and shares to be priced irrespective of shareholder identity. Just like
a regime of unlimited liability conditions the value of corporate shares on the
wealth of shareholders, veil peeking conditions the value of the ﬁrm on
certain regulatory advantages or drawbacks triggered by the identity of
shareholders.141 Veil peeking can thereby discourage control transfers that
could be optimal from an agency cost or industrial organization perspective.
While some forms of veil peeking intentionally seek to restrict share
transfers, as in nationality and foreign ownership restrictions, in other
contexts reduced transferability is an accidental byproduct of veil peeking.142
Crucially, regulatory partitioning also carries beneﬁts and costs that are
distinct from those of asset partitioning. In upholding the separation between
the legal spheres of the corporation and its non-controlling shareholders,
regulatory partitioning is essential for the proper functioning of enterprises
with numerous and changing members. The corporation is prima facie
shielded from the variety of legal obligations and disabilities aﬀecting its
shareholders, from non-compete obligations and disqualiﬁcation from
government contracts to international sanctions. By contributing to the
stability and foreseeability of the legal regime applicable to the corporate
entity, this form of regulatory shielding with respect to non-controlling
141 A related argument is that unlimited liability hampers share transferability. See Paul
Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 130 (1980) (positing that, in the absence of limited
liability, the purchase price of equity securities would depend on the wealth of shareholders); FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
42 (1991) (observing the same). However, there are important diﬀerences in the ways veil piercing
and veil peeking impinge on share pricing and transferability. Veil piercing reduces the price wealthy
shareholders are willing to pay for corporate shares, but it does not aﬀect shareholders who are
judgment proof or the operation of the corporation itself other than by increasing its cost of capital.
By contrast, veil peeking can easily aﬀect the status and operation of the ﬁrm for the detriment or
beneﬁt of all shareholders.
142 Consider, for instance, how the legal regime established in the COMILOG case may deter
control transfers to parent companies located in more developed jurisdictions. See infra notes 249–
50 and accompanying text (discussing the COMILOG case ﬁnding jurisdiction in France for
unlawful conduct in Congo after control of the Congolese company was transferred to a French company).
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shareholders is as fundamental to the viability of ﬁrms with numerous
shareholders as entity shielding.143
Precisely for this reason, the actual operation of veil peeking is invariably
premised not on the ownership of a single share or minority stake in a
corporation, but on the existence of corporate control.144 Just as veil piercing
is not used to reach the assets of a corporation’s workers, consumers, creditors,
or minority shareholders,145 veil peeking applies exclusively vis-à-vis
controlling shareholders or, less frequently, top managers. While scholars
have questioned the choice of shareholders as the relevant target for veil
peeking,146 the relationship between veil peeking and corporate control is
remarkably strong and for good functional reasons. Corporate control
eﬀectively blurs the boundaries of the ﬁrm.147
Although less existential, the upholding of regulatory partitioning vis-àvis controlling shareholders also oﬀers important beneﬁts. Importantly, it
reduces regulatory costs, since control-based regulations can be costly to
implement. Not only do they hinder share transferability as a key attribute of
the corporate form, as discussed above, but adjudicating control begets legal
mud. Corporate control is a key legal and economic concept that is
exceptionally diﬃcult to deﬁne ex ante and can also be quite costly to verify
ex post.148
143 For the key economic role of entity shielding (or aﬃrmative asset partitioning), see
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 390; Hansmann et al., supra note 1, at 1336.
144 The exception is categorical shareholder-friendly veil peeking which levels the
organizational playing ﬁeld by attributing fundamental rights to corporations.
145 See, e.g., Pargendler, supra note 102, at 22 (describing how Brazilian labor courts often pierce
the corporate veil to hold minority shareholders liable for corporate obligations).
146 See Blair & Pollman, supra note 135, at 1730 (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Hobby Lobby for not explaining “why the shareholders were the appropriate persons from whom to
derive a religious exemption from an employee health beneﬁt requirement for the corporation,
despite one of the corporations involved having more than 13,000 employees, whose religious beliefs
were not considered”).
147 See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
148 The continued expansion of the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) to review transactions that could pose a threat to national security
illustrates the diﬃculties in deﬁning control. Following the changes introduced by the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), CFIUS review now encompasses
not only controlling stakes but also “[o]ther investments” that give foreign persons access to material
technical information, board membership, or observer rights or involvement in substantive decisionmaking in connection with critical infrastructure, critical technology, or sensitive personal data. 50
U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D). Another fundamental diﬃculty is that control may to some extent take
place through means other than stock ownership, which could help defeat veil peeking inquiries. See,
e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015) (ﬁnding that a contractual
management agreement that limits a corporation’s strategic options does not characterize control in
the absence of signiﬁcant stock ownership and voting power). Interestingly, Chinese ﬁrms have
channeled massive foreign investment through contractual (rather than equity) rights in “variable
interest entities” (VIEs) holding operating licenses and other sensitive assets—a structure aimed at
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Existing attempts to create rule-based deﬁnitions of control—such as
linking it to the holding of a majority of the voting stock or of a certain
threshold of shares—can be easily over- or underinclusive in identifying
actual instances of corporate control. On the other hand, the type of openended inquiry into actual corporate control can be costly, unpredictable, and
prone to error. This is one reason why corporate law rules are often not
tailored to ownership and control structure, even though scholars seem to
agree that ﬁrms with diﬀerent ownership structures are best served by
diﬀerent corporate law regimes.149
The high cost of open-ended control inquiries is also a key reason why the
law so often refuses to peek despite the importance of corporate control,
resorting instead to objective criteria for the attribution of legal
consequences, such as the principal place of business or place of
incorporation. In other words: because control inquiries are costly, they are
used only when the stakes are high, control inherently matters to accomplish
the regulatory objective, and the legal problems in question are not routine.
For routine matters, veil peeking is eschewed in favor of more objective
criteria. Conversely, veil peeking is often used when the regulatory question
at hand is both non-routine and consequential, as in antitrust and national
security matters.150
Despite its beneﬁts, regulatory partitioning can also be costly in
frustrating the state’s regulatory eﬀorts. Precisely because the corporation
serves as a separate nexus for regulation, it operates as a chief instrument for
purposes of regulatory arbitrage.151 This means that the essential tradeoﬀ
between regulatory partitioning and veil peeking relates to the beneﬁts of
reducing regulatory costs and facilitating share transfers, on the one hand,
and the potential harm to regulatory eﬀectiveness, on the other.
circumventing Chinese regulations that restrict foreign investment in certain industries through veil
peeking. See Schumpeter, A Legal Vulnerability at the Heart of China’s Big Internet Firms, THE
ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/09/16/a-legal-vulnerabilityat-the-heart-of-chinas-big-internet-firms [https://perma.cc/8X8T-BSP8] (discussing the use of VIEs
to own assets in “politically sensitive sectors” of China’s economy).
149 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance
Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1280 (2009) (arguing there are diﬀerent corporate governance
best practices for companies with concentrated and dispersed ownership structures).
150 For examples, see supra Section II.B (national security during wartime) and infra Section
VI.B (antitrust).
151 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010) (outlining a
theory of regulatory arbitrage that reveals how it ultimately “undermines the rule of law”); Frank
Partnoy, The Law of Two Prices: Regulatory Arbitrage Revisited, 107 GEO. L.J. 1017, 1018-19 (2019)
(arguing that regulatory arbitrage warrants caution because, unlike ﬁnancial arbitrage, it can lead to
the persistence of diﬀerent prices for economically equivalent transactions). To be sure, the use of
the corporate form for purposes of regulatory arbitrage can at times lead to results that are both fair
and efficient, as in the recognition of “colorless corporations” in People’s Pleasure Park. See supra Section II.D.
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Nevertheless, because veil peeking is not a unitary phenomenon, its
precise eﬀects will depend on the modality involved. Tailored veil peeking is
both costlier to apply and potentially more disruptive to share transferability
than categorical veil peeking, though—as the name suggests—more tailored
to the realization of the regulatory objectives in a particular case. Categorical
veil peeking that levels the organizational playing ﬁeld by attributing
fundamental rights to all corporations, as in Citizens United, is easy to
adjudicate and does not hinder share transferability in a meaningful way.
Although various commentators have chastised the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United as insuﬃciently tailored,152 the categorical
approach has the overlooked beneﬁt of achieving organizational neutrality
and promoting share transferability.153 However, even fairly categorical veil
peeking rules, as in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision, holding
there can be no antitrust conspiracy between a parent and a wholly owned
subsidiary,154 can discourage share transferability by muddying the legal
regime applicable to partial subsidiaries.
Shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking may increase monitoring costs by
shareholders and creditors. By linking a corporation’s regulatory status to the
composition of its shareholder base, shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking
increases regulatory risk and makes it more diﬃcult to evaluate it. In a world
where veil peeking is permitted, non-controlling shareholders and creditors
must worry about legal disadvantages stemming from the status of controlling
shareholders. To be sure, non-controlling shareholders and creditors can and
do, to some extent, protect themselves by contracting for change-of-control
provisions in credit agreements,155 or through share transfer restrictions and
tag-along rights in corporate charters or shareholder agreements.156 These

152 See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 135, at 1733; Randall P. Benzanson, No Middle Ground?
Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 652-53 (2011) (contending that the
Court could and should have reached a narrower holding based on the characteristics of the
organization in question).
153 For an account of the constitutional jurisprudence on corporate rights in terms of
organizational neutrality, see Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101
IOWA L. REV. 499, 503 (2016), which argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s seemingly inconsistent
approach to questions concerning the nature of the ﬁrm are actually uniﬁed in a theory of
organizational neutrality, which “stands for the idea that the burden of actual or potential regulation
should not affect the mode of organization through which entrepreneurs choose to coordinate group activity.”
154 See infra Section VI.B.
155 See, e.g., Ningzhong Li, Yun Lou & Florin P. Vasvari, Default Clauses in Debt Contracts, 20
REV. ACCT. STUD. 1596, 1609 (2015) (ﬁnding that a change in control constitutes an event of default
in seventy-one percent of loan agreements in their sample).
156 See, e.g., XAVIER RUIZ & MARTA GARCIA, IBA GUIDE ON SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS
(DELAWARE, NEW YORK AND FLORIDA, USA) 4 (2018), https://perma.cc/C22L-NPDQ (referring
the lawful use of transfer restrictions and tag-along rights in shareholder agreements).
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protections, however, often come at the cost of decreased liquidity and
potentially higher agency costs.157
Moreover, even categorical veil peeking that is beneficial to shareholders
may at times increase agency costs. This argument has been raised in the context
of the Citizens United decision, since heterogeneous, welfare-maximizing
shareholders may not uniformly favor a given firm’s political contributions.
There are, however, less drastic corporate law solutions to this problem beyond
banning veil peeking, assuming they were constitutionally permissible.158
Importantly, the magnitude of liquidity, monitoring, and agency costs
raised by veil peeking is likely much lower than that of veil piercing. This is
because (1) the legal scenarios leading to detrimental veil peeking are
relatively circumscribed and (2) such regulatory risk may be a second-order
consideration compared to the ﬁrst-order credit risk and related monitoring
costs that exist in the absence of asset partitioning.
To put it diﬀerently: it is one thing to risk having a corporation exposed
to an undesirable rule or regulation. It is quite another to have one’s entire
wealth at risk due to corporate obligations which could ensue in the absence
of limited liability, or to have the corporation at risk because of individual
shareholder debts, which could ensue in the absence of entity shielding. Veil
piercing relates to credit risk, which is all-encompassing. Veil peeking
pertains only to some forms of regulatory risk, at times reducing it
(shareholder-friendly veil peeking) and at times increasing it (shareholderunfriendly veil peeking).
One peculiarity is that shareholder-unfriendly veil peeking can harm
innocent, non-controlling shareholders via the imputation of legal detriments
to the corporation based on the actions or identity of the controlling
shareholders. This contrasts with veil piercing, where the imposition of
liability for corporate obligations can, and usually does, aﬀect only controlling
shareholders. This means that ownership structure should matter more for
veil peeking than for veil piercing, since the latter can more easily leave

157 All of these mechanisms operate as entrenchment devices that can hamper the transfer of
control to more eﬀective managers, thereby enhancing agency costs. For the economic tradeoﬀs
associated with tag-along rights that grant minority shareholders the right to sell in a sale-of-control
transaction, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Eﬃcient and Ineﬃcient Sales of Corporate Control,
109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 960 (1994), which explains how premium-sharing rules can block eﬃcient as
well as ineﬃcient control transfers.
158 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comment, Corporate Political Speech:
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 97-111 (2010) (discussing how special corporate rules could
remedy the interest divergence between management and shareholders on decisions related to
corporate political speech and addressing the associated constitutional concerns).
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minority shareholders unscathed.159 All else being equal, the case for veil
peeking is generally far stronger with respect to closely held corporations
compared to widely held ﬁrms, and stronger still with respect to wholly
owned or nearly wholly owned subsidiaries.
Shareholder-friendly veil peeking, by contrast, increases the attractiveness
of the corporate form to entrepreneurs. In its absence, entrepreneurs would
need to trade oﬀ the economic beneﬁts associated with the corporate
attributes against a disfavored regulatory treatment imposed on the corporate
form. By foreclosing regulatory diﬀerentiation between natural persons and
corporations, or between corporations and other organizational forms,
shareholder-friendly veil peeking eliminates this tradeoﬀ and encourages
incorporation.
Finally, reverse veil peeking involves distinct costs and beneﬁts. Take, for
instance, the regime allowing shareholders to claim in their own name
compensation for losses suﬀered by the corporation. Contrary to existing
critiques,160 reverse veil peeking of this kind is shareholder friendly; it does
not compromise the economic beneﬁts of asset partitioning, since the
shareholder’s claim is ﬁled against a third-party and not the corporation.
This form of reverse veil peeking appears to be useful precisely when, for
imputation reasons, the corporation is prevented from exercising its rights. A
classic scenario is when a foreign-owned, but locally-incorporated company,
is the victim of expropriation by a host state.161 However, reverse veil peeking
also creates the risk of duplication in claims and double recovery when both
the corporation and foreign investors are allowed to sue host states.162 Other
forms of reverse veil peeking, as in the attribution of shareholder approval
rights at the parent level for transactions carried out by subsidiaries, appear
to be less detrimental, at most posing diﬃculties of line drawing.
B. Criteria for the Application of Veil Peeking
Veil piercing doctrine is muddy and notoriously indeterminate. The
literature typically cites several factors that courts supposedly take into
account when deciding to pierce the corporate veil and render shareholders
liable for corporate obligations, including undercapitalization, commingling
of assets, the failure to observe corporate formalities, unity of interest, fraud,
159 Scholars have similarly argued that asset partitioning provides fewer beneﬁts in the context
of wholly owned subsidiaries. See, e.g., Hansmann & Squire, supra note 2, at 266 tbl. 11.1 (listing the
reduced beneﬁts of internal asset partitioning).
160 See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
161 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
162 See Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1, 37 (2019) (“Tribunals’ tendency to view corporate claims and claims by discrete shareholders as
completely independent raises two specters: double recovery and multiple bites at the apple.”).
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and the operation of the company as the “alter ego” of shareholders, among
others.163 Jonathan Macey and Joshua Mitts have questioned whether these
oft-repeated factors accurately describe the criteria used by courts. Their
empirical study suggests that, in practice, veil piercing is used to achieve three
diﬀerent statutory objectives that are consistent with eﬃciency: (1) realizing
the purpose of a statute or regulation; (2) avoiding misrepresentation by
shareholders; and (3) avoiding favoritism and maximizing ﬁrm value in the
bankruptcy context.164
Following the current state of the doctrinal literature, existing empirical
studies do not distinguish between veil piercing and veil peeking.165 A
systematic mapping of the criteria used in veil peeking cases—and how they
diﬀer from veil piercing cases—would therefore require further research. The
existing conﬂation between veil piercing and veil peeking is arguably one
reason why veil piercing doctrine is so muddled.
Both logic and some of the actual cases examined throughout this Article
suggest that veil peeking at times is, as it should be, subject to diﬀerent
criteria from veil piercing.166 Nevertheless, it also appears that courts and
scholars frequently err in applying restrictive veil piercing criteria for veil
peeking claims,167 which is understandable given the prevailing doctrinal
conﬂation. The time has come to distinguish the relevant criteria for veil
piercing and veil peeking disputes.
While factors such as commingling of assets and fraud are relevant for
veil piercing, they should not be required for veil peeking, which concerns the
eﬀectiveness of a given regulatory scheme. Veil peeking should not be deemed
to be necessarily exceptional nor to require a showing of willful abuse.
Conversely, criteria such as the existence of “domination or control” is
absolutely critical for veil peeking, but less so for veil piercing.168
See Macey & Mitts, supra note 4, at 100.
Id. at 102.
For empirical studies on veil piercing that do not distinguish between exceptions to asset
and regulatory partitioning, see generally, for example, id.; Thompson, supra note 4; Oh, supra note 4.
166 See, e.g., supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text and infra note 224 and accompanying text.
168 Some have critiqued the use of the control or domination criterion in veil piercing claims.
See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 854 (1997) (ﬁnding that the signiﬁcance of
domination is “often misunderstood,” while control tends to be a “red herring” for justifying veil
piercing); Jonathan R. Macey, The Central Role of Myth in Corporate Law 37 (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 519, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435676 (arguing that the use of
corporate control or domination as a possible criterion for veil piercing leads to a general myth that
“parent companies operate their subsidiaries in a manner that is wholly independent of the
operations of both the parent corporation and the subsidiaries’ aﬃliates”). Insofar as traditional veil
piercing doctrinal criteria such as “alter ego,” “unity of interest,” and “control and domination”
eﬀectively serve as proxies for corporate control, they should be part of the test for veil peeking.
163
164
165
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Because judicial veil peeking fundamentally concerns gap ﬁlling of legal
texts, courts should consider the purposes of the law in question, and the
extent to which upholding regulatory partitioning may compromise the law’s
desired eﬀectiveness.169 At any rate, the costs and beneﬁts of veil peeking
must be assessed in view of the particular objectives of a given legal rule and
area of law. As correctly argued nearly a century ago, “the question whether a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from the stockholders cannot be
asked, or answered, in vacuo.”170
VI. VEIL PEEKING IN CONTEMPORARY LAW
Veil peeking remains prevalent and controversial in a broad range of
ﬁelds. This Part explores a representative sample of veil peeking cases to
demonstrate the breadth and importance of this phenomenon, as well as its
diﬀerent manifestations and challenges.
A. Incorporating Race
After veil peeking cases of the Jim Crow era were resolved through the
strict application of regulatory partitioning (leading to “colorless
corporations”), various statutory initiatives sought to impose diﬀerential
treatment on companies depending on the race of their members. These
initiatives range from the odious, such as the Nazi’s attempt to ascribe Jewish
identity to legal persons,171 to the well-intentioned but controversial, such as
the granting of favorable treatment for minority-controlled businesses with
the aim of remediating the eﬀects of past discrimination and injustice.
Both federal and local laws in the United States have embraced statutory
veil peeking to confer remedial advantages to business organizations owned
and controlled by minorities. The Public Works and Employment Act of 1977
required that, absent an administrative waiver, at least ten percent of federal
funds granted to public works should be used by state or local grantees to
procure services from business owned by certain minorities.172 Similarly, the
city of Richmond adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan requiring city
169 Considerations of “justice” traditionally mentioned in veil piercing cases may help provide
the doctrinal rubric for this assessment.
170 Latty, supra note 79, at 603; see also id. at 621 (“The defects of the intransigent conceptualism
which apparently accompanies the entity technique are of themselves a source of danger in legal thinking.”).
171 For instance, the Nuremberg laws qualiﬁed as Jewish a legal person if any of its legal
representatives, members of the supervisory board, or controlling shareholders were Jews. Although
Hitler initially sought to limit corporate anonymity by banning bearer shares, the proposal faced
resistance from the corporate community and was ultimately abandoned. Brooks, supra note 80, at 2079-80.
172 Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, sec. 103, § 106(f)(2), 91 Stat. 116,
117 (1977) (codiﬁed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)).
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contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each
contract to enterprises that were at least ﬁfty-one percent owned and
controlled by the same minority groups.173
These are cases of explicit veil peeking by lawmakers, as opposed to
judicial veil peeking as gap ﬁlling. The question, then, concerns the
constitutional permissibility of such diﬀerential regulatory treatment based
on race. Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the favorable
treatment aﬀorded to minority-owned businesses in the federal Public Works
and Employment Act in Fullilove v. Klutznick174 but invalidated the Richmond
program as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.175 However, the City
of Richmond opinion arguably departed from precedent about colorless
corporations by tacitly resorting to veil peeking, in that it “implicitly
recognized that corporations can have racial characteristics by allowing white
owned corporations to challenge contractor set asides on reverse
discrimination grounds.”176
There are also traditional cases of judicial veil peeking where the relevant
statute is silent. One prominent such statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (originally
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866), which protects the equal rights of
“[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to make and
enforce contracts” without respect to race.177 The issue here is whether
corporations can claim a racial identity in § 1981 claims based on the racial
identity of its members. Various courts have answered in the aﬃrmative.178
In Thinket Ink Information Resources, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit engaged in veil peeking to hold that a corporation entirely
owned by African Americans and certiﬁed by the United States Small
Business Act as a ﬁrm owned by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals could raise a discrimination claim under § 1981.179 While
acknowledging the “anti-anthropomorphic truism” that a corporation
generally has no racial identity, the court concluded that a corporation can
acquire an “imputed racial identity” in certain cases so as not to leave it and
its shareholders without remedies.180 The court reasoned that “if a
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980).
488 U.S. at 511.
Brooks, supra note 80, at 2056 n.150 (quoting Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun
Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
177 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); see also Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
178 See, e.g., Carnell Constr. Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 745 F.3d 703,
715 (4th Cir. 2014); Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir.
2002); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1979).
179 368 F.3d at 1059.
180 Id. at 1058-59.
173
174
175
176
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corporation can suﬀer harm from discrimination, it has standing to litigate
that harm.”181 This instance of veil peeking extends the reach of state
regulations but in a way that is shareholder friendly and increases the
attractiveness of the corporate form.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the possibility of veil
peeking in this context, its decision in Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald
foreclosed the use of reverse veil peeking by denying shareholders standing
to raise § 1981 claims in connection with contracts signed by the corporation
in its own name.182 In that case, plaintiﬀ John McDonald, a Black man, was
the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments (JWM), which
entered into several contracts with Domino’s Pizza.183 JWM subsequently
ﬁled for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy estate settled with Domino’s Pizza
without raising a discrimination claim through veil peeking.184
The Ninth Circuit recognized the sole shareholder’s standing to sue for
the wrongful breach of contract due to racial animus by conceding the
existence of “injuries distinct from that of the corporation” (such as pain and
suﬀering, emotional distress and humiliation).185 However, the unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,
reversed the Ninth Circuit and found no standing.186 In refusing to extend
the reach of the statute, Scalia wrote that “it is fundamental corporation and
agency law—indeed, it can be said to be the whole purpose of corporation
and agency law—that the shareholder and contracting oﬃcer of a corporation
has no rights and is exposed to no liability under the corporation’s
contracts”187 and that “nothing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was meant
to provide an omnibus remedy for all racial injustice.”188 The holding can be
understood as seeking to uphold a restrictive interpretation of the statute and
avoid the administrative challenges associated with reverse veil peeking.
However, as examined above,189 a plaintiﬀ victory in the case would not in
fact have compromised the functionality of the corporation’s core elements.

181 Id. at 1060 (quoting Gersman v. Grp. Health Ass’n, 931 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 1068 (1992)).
182 546 U.S. 470, 476-77 (2006).
183 Id. at 472.
184 Id. at 473.
185 Id. at 474 (quoting McDonald v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 107 F. App’x 18, 18 (9th Cir. 2004)).
186 Id. at 480.
187 Id. at 477.
188 Id. at 479.
189 See infra Section V.A.
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B. Antitrust
Veil peeking has a long pedigree in competition law, a ﬁeld that has from
the outset witnessed the use of legal entities for regulatory arbitrage. The use
of the trust form—leading to the ﬁeld’s name antitrust—was itself an attempt
to evade the competition-driven constraints of early corporation laws.190
Nevertheless, as State v. Standard Oil and similar cases made clear, courts were
willing to engage in veil peeking to restrict such arbitrage opportunities.191
Perhaps more than any other ﬁeld, antitrust law has ﬁercely disregarded
separate legal personalities in favor of veil peeking. While certain
jurisdictions at times also resort to veil piercing in the antitrust context (such
as by imposing liability on parent companies for antitrust violations by their
subsidiaries)192, veil peeking for purposes of imputation of legal restrictions
is even more prevalent. The relevant tests for the application of antitrust laws
tend to be economic rather than formalistic in nature, thereby valuing
corporate control and the identity of shareholders and disregarding separate
legal personalities.
As is usually the case with veil peeking, such an approach is not
unambiguously pro- or anti-regulation, but instead can cut either way.
Although early instances of veil peeking served to strengthen state authority
over market activities, more recent cases operate to restrict the scope of
antitrust laws.193 However, unlike other ﬁelds, the circumvention of
regulatory partitioning in antitrust law has only rarely been conceptualized
as “veil piercing,” and antitrust has beneﬁted greatly by avoiding the doctrinal
confusion associated with the misleading label.194
In the leading case of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that a wholly owned subsidiary is incapable of
conspiring with its parent under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,195 which
requires a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” between separate
persons.196 The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the
provision in question does not reach conduct that is “wholly unilateral,” a

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 63-64 (explaining the origin of the term).
See supra Section II.C.
See generally Karl Hofstetter & Melanie Ludescher, Fines Against Parent Companies in EU
Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for ‘Best Practice Compliance,’ 33 WORLD COMPETITION 55 (2010)
(discussing the EU’s imposition of ﬁnes on parent companies for their subsidiaries’ violations of
competition law).
193 See, e.g., infra Section VI.B.
194 One exception is the seminal paper by Maurice Wormser. See Wormser, supra note 12, at
509-10 (citing the early antitrust precedents of Standard Oil and North River Sugar Refining Co.
discussed in supra Section II.C).
195 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
196 15 U.S.C. § 1.
190
191
192
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conclusion that relies on the irrelevance of separate legal personalities for
antitrust purposes.197
For the Court, the relevant factor for the purposes of Section 1 was not
the formal presence of multiple persons (commonly referred to as the
“plurality” requirement in antitrust law), but the functional characterization
of “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,” the
conspiracy between whom “deprives the marketplace of the independent
centers of decisionmaking.”198 This element is notably absent in the
relationship between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary.199 In adopting
a veil peeking approach that excludes the possibility of “intra-enterprise
conspiracy” between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary, the Court’s
opinion explicitly supports a principle of organizational neutrality by seeking
to level the playing ﬁeld between enterprises adopting diﬀerent legal entity
structures.200 It reasons that antitrust laws should not prevent ﬁrms from
enjoying other beneﬁts of separate incorporation, such as facilitating
management, avoiding tax problems, or “serv[ing] other legitimate
interests.”201 In Justice Burger’s words, “[i]f antitrust liability turned on the
garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be
encouraged to convert subsidiaries into unincorporated divisions.”202
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, argued that the veil
peeking approach embraced by the majority detracted from the underlying
statutory objectives.203 It reasoned that the requirement of a plurality of
actors under Section 1 results from “the plain statutory language, not [from]
any economic principle.”204 Justice Stevens further contended that the
unreasonable restraint requirement of Section 1 already protects parentsubsidiary structures because such aﬃliation often enhances eﬃciency and is
thus procompetitive.205 Consequently, the categorical peeking of the majority
“leaves a signiﬁcant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to
anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to the eﬃciencies
associated with integration.”206
Following Copperweld, the question became the scope of the Court’s
categorical veil peeking approach beyond the context of wholly owned
197 Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 768 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968),
overruled on other grounds by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
198 Id. at 769.
199 See id. at 771 (“A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest.”).
200 Id. at 772.
201 Id. at 772-73.
202 Id. at 773.
203 Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 789.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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subsidiaries, hence illustrating how categorical approaches to veil peeking
may compel subsequent tailoring. Are subsidiaries with de minimis departure
from whole ownership by the parent exempted from Section 1 scrutiny under
Copperweld? Is the exercise of corporate control over the subsidiary the
relevant test? If so, how should courts draw the line?
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the agreement between members of the National Football
League, a joint venture of the football teams, was categorically excluded from
scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.207 The Court, once again,
aﬃrmed the prevalence of “competitive reality,” privileging economic
function over legal entity boundaries.208
The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stevens held that just as the
presence of “legally distinct entities” is not determinative, “nor . . . is it
determinative that two legally distinct entities have organized themselves
under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture.”209 Consequently,
the joint venture was not categorically excluded from Section 1 and was
therefore allowed to be scrutinized further under antitrust law’s Rule of
Reason.210 In view of such radical veil peeking, it has been said that the
“corporate form under state law does not matter” in the U.S. Supreme Court
antitrust jurisprudence.211
C. Nationality
Diﬀerences in the legal treatment conferred on nationals vis-à-vis
foreigners are a central source of legal discrimination in modern law. The
attribution of nationality to corporations usually entails a bundle of legal
consequences. These include the determination of the internal rules of
corporate law applicable to the company; legal privileges bestowed on
nationals such as access to government subsidies; restrictions imposed on
certain foreign nationals such as wartime rules on trading with the enemy and
national security rules, or foreign nationals generally such as foreign
ownership restrictions in certain industries; access to diplomatic protection;
coverage under international treaties; the application of tax laws; and the
existence of state jurisdiction for legal disputes involving the company.
Jurisdictions around the world generally opt for one of two criteria for the
attribution of nationality: (1) the place of incorporation, or (2) the principal
560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010).
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Herbert Hovenkamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust Law 14
(Working Paper, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1616625.
207
208
209
210
211
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place of business (“real seat doctrine”).212 Jurisdictions embracing the real seat
doctrine typically require local incorporation of companies headquartered in
the state.213 Both criteria are objective and do not consider the company’s
shareholder base or control structure, which is often ﬂuid in business
corporations given the attribute of transferable shares. In other words, the
two general approaches to corporate nationality both shun veil peeking.
Because the place of incorporation can be altered at less cost than
corporate headquarters, it is more often the object of choice, enabling the
phenomenon known as regulatory competition. While the corporate law
component of the bundle has been traditionally viewed as the primary driver
of regulatory competition, companies have increasingly considered other
legal consequences when engaging in nationality shopping, such as tax laws214
and legal protection under international investment treaties.215 Of course, the
utilization of a single doctrinal hook for such varied purposes may not be
functional in all circumstances.
In a well-known incident in 2018, a U.S. presidential decree prevented
technology ﬁrm Broadcom from acquiring its rival Qualcomm based on the
risk the transaction posed to U.S. national security.216 Broadcom was deemed
to be a foreign buyer and subject to regulatory scrutiny based on its
incorporation in Singapore.217 It was deemed to be foreign even though it had
been previously chartered in the United States, was in the process of
reincorporating in the United States, was headquartered in California, most
of its directors were U.S. citizens, and more than ﬁfty percent of its workers
and of ninety percent of its shareholders were based in the United States.218
Had Broadcom never moved its statutory domicile to Singapore for tax
purposes, or had reincorporated in the United States with greater speed, it
212 For the origins of these criteria and their exceptions, see generally Mariana Pargendler, The
Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law, 95 IND. L.J. 533, 541, 564 (2020).
213 Id. at 538.
214 This is exempliﬁed by the recent wave of corporate inversions. See Colleen Walsh, Getting
a Handle on Inversion: A Q&A with Mihir Desai, HARV. L. TODAY (Aug. 15, 2014),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/harvard-gazette-mihir-desai-getting-handle-inversion
[https://perma.cc/E9H5-FHW5] (attributing a higher frequency of U.S. corporations shifting their
headquarters for tax purposes to the American worldwide tax regime and high corporate tax rate).
215 See infra notes 223–28 and accompanying text.
216 Presidential Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of Qualcomm Incorporated by
Broadcom Limited, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,631 (Mar. 15, 2018).
217 See Jason Benitez, CFIUS: The Next Poison Pill? 3 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
ﬁle with author).
218 See id. at 3, 44-45. However, Broadcom’s CEO Tan Hock Eng is Malaysian. Amir Hisyam
Rasid, Malaysian Is US’ Best-Paid CEO, NEW STRAITSTIMES (May 15, 2008, 6:50 AM),
https://www.nst.com.my/business/2018/05/369778/malaysian-us-best-paid-ceo
[https://perma.cc/L8KB-JYY2]. To the extent that this fact played a part in the incident, it would
represent a form of implicit veil peeking with respect to managers rather than shareholders.
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would have likely escaped regulatory scrutiny.219 Nevertheless, in view of the
threat posed by the technological rise of China, the Committee for Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and President Trump refused to
peek and treat Broadcom as a domestic company.
Veil peeking regarding nationality is not limited to the sensitive
considerations of wartime or peacetime national security described above. In
a prominent 1953 decision, a U.K. court engaged in veil peeking to deny the
beneﬁts of quotas under the Cinematograph Films Act of 1938 to a ﬁlm
produced by a U.K.-incorporated subsidiary that was ninety percent owned
and controlled by a U.S. company and had no signiﬁcant assets or employees
of its own.220 The court found that the U.K. company was a mere agent or
nominee of the U.S. parent, so that the ﬁlm could not be deemed “British”
under the statutory language requiring the maker of the ﬁlm to be a “British
subject or a British company.”221
The ﬁeld of international investment law is premised on the need to
provide enhanced legal protection to foreign investors at the international
level, with the aim of counteracting the protectionist tendencies of host states
to expropriate foreigners once their investment is “sunk.”222 Regulatory
diﬀerentiation between nationals and foreigners is therefore central to the
ﬁeld. Predictably, the disparate legal regime gives rise to various forms of veil
peeking controversies, due both to the design of international treaties and to
attempts at regulatory arbitrage.
The rising phenomenon of “nationality shopping” in international
investment law illustrates the arbitrage opportunity. This strategy takes place
when investors who would not be protected under international investment
law—either because they are nationals of the host state or because they are
citizens of a country that is not a signatory—employ a corporation formed in
a jurisdiction with broad treaty coverage to beneﬁt from enhanced investment
protection. One manifestation of this trend is the so-called “Dutch sandwich”
strategy, which refers to the formation of foreign (often Dutch) intermediary
subsidiaries in states with ample bilateral investment treaty (BIT) coverage
to obtain enhanced investment protection at home or abroad.223

219 For an in-depth discussion of this transaction, see generally Benitez, supra note 217, which
examines the deal in the context of the changing role of the CFIUS in cross-border transactions.
220 Re FG (Films) Ltd., [1953] 1 All ER 615 (Ch) at 616 (Eng.).
221 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
222 See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, Bargaining over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for
Protection and Promotion of International Investment, 66 WORLD POL. 12, 18 (2014).
223 See George Kahale, III, The New Dutch Sandwich: The Issue of Treaty Abuse, COLUM. FDI
PERSPS., Oct. 2011, at 1 (“Companies from all over the world having little if anything to do with the
Netherlands seek to acquire Dutch nationality to take advantage of the protections oﬀered by Dutch
BITs.”); see also ROOS VAN OS & ROELINE KNOTTNERUS, DUTCH BILATERAL INVESTMENT
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Arbitral tribunals have generally upheld such arbitrage attempts based on
the absence of the traditional requirements for veil piercing, such as fraud or
commingling of assets. In Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, for instance, the arbitral
panel ruled that a company that was ninety-nine percent owned by Ukrainians
but incorporated in Lithuania could pursue investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) arbitration against the shareholders’ home state of Ukraine under the
Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.224 Such a case upholding strict regulatory
partitioning encourages organizational arbitrage.
The dissenting opinion in the Tokios Tokelés case emphasizes that the
controversy in question was not ultimately about international investment.225
Similarly, commentators have decried the arbitrators’ reliance on “an
inapposite presumption against veil piercing derived from the very diﬀerent
context of limited shareholder liability, without considering the diﬀerent
interests and values at stake across these varied situations.”226 While
exceptions exist,227 investment tribunals have generally indicated a “deep
unwillingness to look through” the corporate veil to restrict the application
of BITs.228
However, the use of the state of incorporation as the determinant of
international law protection is not always a boon for investors. In the case of
Barcelona Traction, the Belgian government ﬁled suit in the International
Court of Justice seeking reparations from Spain.229 Belgium alleged that
Spain violated international law in causing damage to the Belgian
shareholders who controlled Barcelona Traction, a company incorporated in

TREATIES § 1.1 (2011) (observing that there are around 20,000 “holding and ﬁnancial companies” in
the Netherlands and that the country has approximately ninety-ﬁve BITs in force).
224 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 38 (Apr. 29, 2004),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C220/DC639_En.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZT7Q-695J]. Other tribunals have followed a similar approach. See Aguas del Tunari, SA v. Republic of Bol.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 323 (Oct. 21, 2005),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C210/DC629_En.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BXB5-FDNW] (permitting a Dutch incorporated corporation controlled by U.S. company Bechtel to invoke
the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT, which covers entities “controlled directly or indirectly” by a national
of the Netherlands).
225 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of President
Prosper Weil, ¶ 27 (Apr. 29, 2004), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C220/DC640_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY7J-C799].
226 Arato, supra note 162, at 43.
227 See, e.g., TSA Spectrum de Arg. S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5,
Award, ¶ 147 (Dec. 19, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ﬁles/case-documents/ita0874.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C9T-39M9] (looking past the corporate veil to determine whether an entity was
under foreign control).
228 Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 275 (2015).
229 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep.
3, ¶ 1 (Feb. 5).
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Canada.230 Belgium also claimed that Spanish authorities had improperly
discriminated against the company, thereby harming its Belgian shareholders,
with the purpose of transferring control over its property to the hands of a
private Spanish group.231 The International Court of Justice, however, refused
to peek as advocated by Belgium, instead holding that it could not seek to
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Belgian shareholders of a company
incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction when it was the company that suﬀered
the direct harm.232
Moreover, for a variety of tax, regulatory, and convenience reasons, it is
common for foreign investors to operate in host countries through local
subsidiaries, which would in principle qualify as national companies of the
host state based on the place of incorporation. Recognizing this reality, some
U.S. BITs expressly provide for veil peeking by permitting a local company
to invoke treaty protection as a constructive foreign investor if the company
itself would qualify as a covered investment under the treaty.233
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Convention also adopts a veil peeking approach in providing that a
legal person that is a national of the host state, but subject to “foreign control,”
should be treated as a national of another contracting state.234 Moreover,
international investment law provides for the noteworthy possibility of
foreign shareholder claims for reﬂective losses, which represents one of the
rare instances of reverse veil peeking. This regime allows foreign shareholders
to ﬁle claims against host states, in the shareholders’ own names, to recover
the reﬂective loss they suﬀered due to the expropriation of a domestic
corporation. The availability of claims for shareholder reﬂective loss has
attracted much scholarly criticism.235 While this form of reverse veil peeking
Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
Id. ¶ 100.
Arato, supra note 162, at 36. There are also other potential solutions, as exempliﬁed by
NAFTA’s explicit authorization of derivative suits. Id.
234 The ICSID Convention deﬁnes a “National of Another Contracting State” as
230
231
232
233

any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the
State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such
dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which,
because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of
another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 25(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
235 See, e.g., Arato, supra note 162, at 34-35 (“As in domestic law, the scope and limits of
shareholder suits reﬂect judicial choices. The diﬀerence is that, in ISDS, tribunals have placed little
emphasis on policy, relying more on (assumed) textual mandate and arbitral precedent.”).
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does create problems of administration, it does not upend the core tenets of
the corporate form.236
While apparently contradictory, the strict regulatory partitioning
approach of Tokios Tokelés and the bold approaches of veil peeking (in
attributing the shareholders’ nationality to the domestic company) and
reverse veil peeking (in permitting direct shareholder lawsuits) of investment
treaties are actually consistent in their pro-investor results. Veil peeking and
reverse veil peeking are broadly employed to expand treaty coverage, while
arbitral tribunals eschew veil peeking to restrict the scope of protection
provided by international investment treaties. This landscape may reﬂect the
purposive interpretation of the international investment regime, which aims
precisely to protect investors, or the self-interest of arbitrators, who stand to
gain by expanding the number and scope of international investment claims.
D. Jurisdiction
The attribution of jurisdiction is another critical legal consequence of
incorporation, or the creation of a separate legal person. Most states recognize
both the place of incorporation and the principal place of business as grounds
for the assertion of general jurisdiction with respect to legal persons. The
broad veil peeking criterion of individual corporate membership used in Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux has been abandoned since the mid-nineteenth
century due to its ease of manipulation and dysfunctional results.237
However, veil peeking continues to be used for jurisdictional purposes in
the corporate group context. One question is whether a plaintiﬀ may impute
to a corporate parent the jurisdictional grounds that exist with respect to one
of its subsidiaries, or vice-versa. The 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Daimler AG v. Bauman238 deals precisely with such a use of veil peeking. In
that case, Argentinean plaintiﬀs ﬁled suit in California against Daimler, a
Germany public company, under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute.239 The suit
alleged that Daimler’s subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated
with the Argentinean government to kill and torture workers in the 1976–
1983 “Dirty War.”240 Plaintiﬀs sought to assert personal jurisdiction over
Daimler in California based on the distribution of vehicles by Mercedes-Benz
USA LLC, a Delaware corporation, in California.241

236
237
238
239
240
241

See supra Section V.A.
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
571 U.S. 117 (2014).
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 123.
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The Daimler opinion received much attention for the Court’s narrowing
of all-purpose jurisdiction to the paradigmatic grounds of place of
incorporation and principal place of business, ﬁnding the existence of
“continuous and systematic” business in the state to be insuﬃcient.242
However, the veil peeking move of Daimler’s plaintiﬀs in relying on a parent’s
jurisdictional ground for a lawsuit against the subsidiary (provided that it
meets the stricter criteria) was not addressed by the decision and continues
to be used.243 In this case of veil peeking—to impute jurisdiction to the parent
without imposing liability on it—courts have focused on control based on
agency and alter ego theories, without, however, requiring a showing of fraud
or injustice as in typical veil piercing claims.244
France’s COMILOG case, which has been celebrated in human rights
circles, provides another instance of veil peeking for jurisdictional purposes.
In 1991, the Gabonese Ougooué Mining Company (COMILOG) dismissed
995 workers without notice or compensation and ﬁled for bankruptcy
following a deadly train accident.245 In 2003, COMILOG and the
governments of Congo and Gabon reached an agreement by which the
company would pay the states over one million euros as settlement for the
workers’ claims.246 However, the workers were not consulted regarding the
agreement and did not receive any compensation.247
Following the acquisition of a majority of COMILOG’s stock by French
company ERAMET (which was headquartered in France and twenty-six
percent owned by the French government248) in the late 1990s, the Congolese
workers filed suit in France.249 The Paris Court of Appeals found that
COMILOG’s status as a subsidiary of ERAMET provided sufficient
connection to France to exercise jurisdiction and held COMILOG liable to
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
See, e.g., In re Commodity Exch., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 631, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The
Supreme Court’s concern regarding the Ninth Circuit’s ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ does
not apply where there are allegations that the subsidiary was in fact the alter ego of a corporation
over which jurisdiction is proper.” (internal citation omitted))
244 Jana Jobes Wozniak & Teri H. Peeples, Personal Jurisdiction Considerations for Non-U.S.
Parent Companies Facing Product Liability Litigation, IN HOUSE DEF. Q., Winter 2018, at 54, 59
(“Once the court ﬁnds that the U.S. subsidiary is the alter ego of the parent company, the court then
looks at the subsidiary’s contacts with the forum to determine jurisdiction over the parent.”).
245 For a summary of the case in English, see COMILOG lawsuit (Re Gabon, Filed in France),
BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/comiloglawsuit-re-gabon [https://perma.cc/CJM4-QQPP].
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 L’incroyable Victoire des Travailleurs Congolais, LE PARISIEN (Sept. 14, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://www.leparisien.fr/archives/l-incroyable-victoire-des-travailleurs-congolais-14-09-20155088893.php [https://perma.cc/S7JX-5MAM].
249 See COMILOG lawsuit (Re Gabon, Filed in France), supra note 245.
242
243
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the Congolese workers.250 While admirable for permitting the compensation
of past victims of human rights violations, the COMILOG case illustrates how
veil peeking may discourage share transferability, as discussed in Part V above.
E. Tax Laws
Taxation is another fertile ﬁeld for veil peeking. One line of cases
concerns the constitutionality of disparate tax treatment conferred on
diﬀerent legal entities. The famous case of Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad,251 which is widely credited for recognizing that corporations
are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, dealt with California tax rules
that treated corporations less favorably than individuals. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately decided the case on narrow grounds despite the
misleading syllabus and headnotes,252 Circuit Justice Field’s opinion
described the discriminatory treatment of corporations as “the very essence
of tyranny.”253
To be sure, not all instances of disparate regulatory treatment of
corporations are unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the
constitutionality of the corporate income tax as “an excise upon the particular
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity.”254 Other jurisdictions,
such as Brazil and, increasingly, the United States, tax legal persons more

250 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 2e ch., Sept. 10, 2015, 11/05955, at 9; see
also Daniel Augenstein & Nicola Jägers, Judicial Remedies: The Issue of Jurisdiction, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN BUSINESS: REMOVAL OF BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 7, 30-31 (Juan José Álvarez Rubio & Katerina Yiannibas eds., 2017) (describing how “avoiding
a denial of justice” served as a ground for the recognition of French jurisdiction).
251 118 U.S. 394, 394-95 (1886).
252 WINKLER, supra note 12, at 150-53 (describing the curious origins of the syllabus and
headnotes in the United States Reports describing the case as attributing constitutional rights to
corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is in conﬂict with the narrow ruling and
content of the Court’s opinion).
253 He continued:

Strangely, indeed, would the law sound in case it read that in the assessment and
taxation of property a deduction should be made for mortgages thereon if the property
be owned by white men or by old men, and not deducted if owned by black men or by
young men; deducted if owned by landsmen, not deducted if owned by sailors;
deducted if owned by married men, not deducted if owned by bachelors; deducted if
owned by men doing business alone, not deducted if owned by men doing business in
partnerships or other associations; deducted if owned by trading corporations, not
deducted if owned by churches or universities; and so on, making a discrimination
whenever there was any difference in the character or pursuit or condition of the owner.
Cnty. of Santa Clara v. So. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 396 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1883), aﬀ ’d,
118 U.S. 394 (1886).
254 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911).
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favorably than natural persons, thereby encouraging incorporation of service
providers as a form of tax shelter.255
The place of incorporation is often a relevant hook for the application of
tax laws, even if it is at times complemented by other criteria such as
headquarters location and shareholder control. Such reliance on incorporation
as the relevant hook for taxation creates opportunities for regulatory arbitrage,
which, in turn, tempts tax authorities to engage in veil peeking.
U.S. courts curb the evasion of tax laws based on ﬁctitious transactions
that serve no economic purpose beyond tax savings.256 Courts have applied
veil peeking to question the economic beneﬁts of the creation of a subsidiary
as a tax shelter when the company initiating the transaction retains full
control.257 As an economic expert in these cases, Nobel laureate Oliver Hart
has argued that the boundaries of the ﬁrm are determined by control rights,
not by legal entity distinctions.258 According to this view, reorganizations that
create a new legal person but do not meaningfully change the allocation of
control rights have no economic substance under the “property rights theory
of the ﬁrm,” which disqualiﬁes it for favorable tax treatment.259
Similarly, Brazilian laws apply a simpliﬁed tax regime with lower tax rates
to small enterprises whose revenue falls below certain thresholds.260
Entrepreneurs may want to take advantage of the favorable treatment to
smaller ﬁrms by constituting several legal persons for diﬀerent parts of the
business. The Brazilian tax statute, however, engages in veil peeking to ignore
the legal entity boundaries and consider the combined revenue of the
255 See, e.g., Sérgio Wulﬀ Gobetti & Rodrigo Octávio Orair, Taxation and Distribution of Income
in Brazil: New Evidence from Personal Income Tax Data, 37 BRAZILIAN J. POL. ECON. 267, 272 (2017)
(discussing incentives for the creation of tax shelters under Brazil’s tax laws); David Kamin, David
Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J.
Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro & Manoj
Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax
Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (2019) (discussing incentives for the creation of tax shelters
under post-2017 U.S. tax laws).
256 For a description of the diﬀerent doctrines to counteract abuse, see T. Christopher Borek,
Angelo Frattarelli & Oliver Hart, Tax Shelters or Eﬃcient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm
Perspective on the Economic Substance Doctrine, 57 J.L. & ECON. 975, 975-76 (2014).
257 Id. at 986-95 (discussing Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87 (D. Md. 2003)
and WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, No. 07-3320, 2011 WL 4583817 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2011), as
cases in which subsidiaries were treated as mere divisions (from an economic perspective) given the
maintenance of complete control).
258 Id. at 975, 996 (“[F]rom an economic substance perspective, control is the deﬁning
characteristic of ownership . . . .”)
259 See id. at 977, 996; see also Oliver Hart, Dep’t of Econ., Harv. Univ., Nobel Prize Lecture:
Incomplete Contracts and Control (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/hartlecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EGT-WNUH] (referring to the uses of the property theory of the firm
to inquire into control in the context of tax disputes).
260 Lei Complementar No. 123, de 14 de Dezembro de 2006, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de
15.12.2006 (Braz.).
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diﬀerent companies whenever they are subject to common control.261
Brazilian tax laws also oﬀer favorable treatment to foreign investors and, as
such, have encouraged Brazilian citizens to incorporate abroad, thus also
triggering veil peeking eﬀorts by the tax authorities.262
Veil peeking is also relevant for the application of international tax
treaties. The issue is whether an intermediate holding company may qualify
for an international tax treaty or if tax laws should instead look for beneﬁcial
ownership. In view of a “Dutch sandwich” providing for an intermediary
Dutch company, Canadian courts have applied the Canada-Netherlands
Income Tax Treaty, even though the Dutch vehicle was controlled by Swedish
and U.K. companies.263 Commentators have criticized this approach by
implicitly calling for a distinction between veil piercing and veil peeking,
arguing that the Canadian courts erred in applying the demanding tests for
veil piercing in cases where the veriﬁcation of beneﬁcial ownership should
have suﬃced.264
Finally, tax statutes at times explicitly adopt a veil peeking approach by
conditioning the legal regime on the identity of shareholders. One prominent
example is the use of check-the-box regulation in the United States, which
permits corporations to choose to be treated as pass-through vehicles for tax
purposes, provided they have no more than 100 shareholders who are all
individuals and do not qualify as nonresident aliens.265 Another instance is
the common practice of oﬀering corporate income tax exemptions or
deductions to intercorporate dividends paid by companies within the same
corporate group.266 Finally, certain tax statutes embrace veil peeking by
apportioning tax obligations in view of the underlying “unitary business,”
irrespective of legal entity boundaries.267
Id. art. 3º, § 4º, IV.
Fabio Graner & Fábio Puppo, Receita Aponta Indícios de Fraude em Investimento de Não
Residentes, VALOR (Oct. 30, 2017), https://valor.globo.com/ﬁnancas/noticia/2017/10/30/receitaaponta-indicios-de-fraude-em-investimento-de-nao-residentes-1.ghtml [https://perma.cc/Q2CF-6BHY].
263 See Saurabh Jain & John Prebble, Conceptual Problems of Beneficial Ownership and the
Corporate Veil, 73 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 3 (2019) (describing the decisions of Canadian courts in Prévost
Car Inc. v. The Queen, [2008] D.T.C. 3080 (Can. Tax Ct.) and Velcro Can. Inc. v. The Queen, [2012] 4
C.T.C. 2029 (Can. Tax Ct.)).
264 Id. § 13 (“It is illogical to draw an analogy between the beneﬁcial ownership test and the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.”).
265 See I.R.C. § 1361 (deﬁning an S corporation); id. § 1366 (allowing for pass-thru taxation).
For an additional example of veil peeking in U.S. tax legislation, see I.R.C. §§ 951-965, which taxes
foreign corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders on certain corporate income earned and not distributed.
266 For a description of the evolution of the taxation of intercorporate dividends in the U.S.
tax legislation, see Eugene Kandel, Konstantin Kosenko, Randall Morck & Yishay Yafeh, The Great
Pyramids of America: A Revised History of U.S. Business Groups, Corporate Ownership, and Regulation,
1926–1950, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 781 (2018).
267 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980) (“The argument
that the source of the income precludes its taxability runs contrary to precedent.”).
261
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F. International Sanctions
Another veil peeking scenario in the international context pertains to
whether and how international sanctions imposed on individuals should be
extended to the corporations they control. Take, for instance, the recent
sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on Russian parties as punishment
for Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. election and aggressions in
Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria.268 The sanctions not only covered
Russian government oﬃcials, state-owned enterprises, and oligarchs close to
President Vladimir Putin, but also adopted a veil peeking approach to reach
the companies controlled by these oligarchs.269
The sanctions covered twelve companies controlled by Oleg Deripaska
(including the EN+ Group and aluminum company RUSAL, which accounts
for seven percent of global aluminum production), and extended to any
foreign businesses who attempted to do businesses with the designated
entities.270 The extension of the sanctions to the companies was highly
consequential. Rio Tinto declared force majeure on a major contract to supply
bauxite to RUSAL, aluminum prices rose, and Russian stock prices dropped
following the announcement of the sanctions.271 In view of RUSAL’s market
share for aluminum, the eﬀects of the sanctions on global supply chains were
likely to be signiﬁcant.272
To escape the sanctions, the aﬀected companies implemented various
corporate governance reforms aimed at insulating the entities from
Deripaska’s control. The new governance arrangements included a reduction
in Deripaska’s stake in the ﬁrm to below ﬁfty percent, restrictions on voting
rights to thirty-ﬁve percent, the assignment of voting rights of related parties
268 The very imposition of sanctions against Deripaska, deemed to be a close ally of Putin is
premised on his “having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a senior
oﬃcial of the Government of the Russian Federation” and the fact that “he does not separate himself
from the Russian state.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Russian
Oligarchs, Oﬃcials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0338 [https://perma.cc/S9Q8-D9E5].
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Rio To Call Force Majeure on Some Rusal-Linked Contracts, REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions-rio-tinto/rio-to-call-force-majeure-onsome-rusal-linked-contracts-idUSKBN1HK274 [https://perma.cc/QT29-R5VY] (Apr. 13, 2013, 11:17
AM); Fred Imbert, Russian Stocks Crash on New Sanctions; Aluminum Prices Soar on Penalties to Global
Producer Rusal, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/russian-stocks-crash-on-newsanctions-aluminum-prices-soar-on-penalties-to-global-producer-rusal.html
[https://perma.cc/PW8M-9JVV].
272 For an excellent discussion of the imposition of sanctions on companies controlled by
Deripaska and the use of corporate governance to avoid them, see Daniel K. Phillips, The
Development of Corporate Governance in Post-Soviet Russia and Its Instrumentalization by a PostSoviet Russian (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author).
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to an independent third party, and an independent board of directors, among
other measures.273 The U.S. Department of the Treasury eventually agreed to
lift the sanctions in response to these changes.274
Nevertheless, critics of the sanctions’ lifting have argued that insulation
from Deripaska was illusory, given that the shares were transferred to a trust
for the beneﬁt of his children.275 The controversy illustrates well the diﬃculty
of ascertaining control for purposes of veil peeking. Deripaska, on his part,
has sued the U.S. government, arguing that the sanctions had made him
“radioactive” in international business circles, an eﬀect largely attributable to
the veil peeking approach.276
Even when controlled companies are not speciﬁcally designated for
sanctions, as was the case in the Russia-Deripaska sanctions above, they can
still be subject to rule-based veil peeking in accordance with the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Oﬃce of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
rules. Under the OFAC 50 Percent Rule, all companies that are ﬁfty percent
owned by sanctioned persons are automatically subject to the same
sanctions.277 Adopting a bright-line rule approach, the 50 Percent Rule applies
to ownership, which is more easily veriﬁable than control, so controlled
companies that are less than ﬁfty percent owned need to be speciﬁcally
designated for sanctions.278
G. Government Corporations
The question of regulatory diﬀerentiation across legal entities has two
dimensions when applied to corporations. First, there is the question of
whether the state may treat corporations less favorably than natural persons
or whether the rights of natural persons can instead be attributed to the legal
persons they own and control. Second, there is the question of whether
corporations, as major organizations rivaling or surpassing governments in

Id. at 28.
See Kevin Bohn, Treasury Department Lifts Sanctions on Three Russian Firms with Ties to Oleg
Deripaska, CNN POL. (Jan. 27, 2019, 8:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/27/politics/trumpadmin-lifts-sanctions-oleg-deripaska/index.html [https://perma.cc/UV9U-A2ME] (showing how
corporate governance mechanisms can serve as an antidote to veil peeking).
275 See Kenneth P. Vogel & Alan Rappeport, Russian Oligarch Sues the U.S. Over Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/us/politics/oleg-deripaska-russiasanctions.html [https://perma.cc/2PKD-RP34].
276 Complaint at 17, Deripaska v. Mnuchin, No. 1:19-CV-00727 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2019).
277 Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in
Property Are Blocked, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,726, 47,726 (Aug. 14, 2014).
278 Frequently Asked Questions: Entities Owned by Blocked Person (50% Rule), U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (Aug. 11, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1521
[https://perma.cc/7ZDL-9AR7].
273
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economic importance,279 should be subject to legal duties comparable to those
governing the state. This latter question is increasingly the object of debate,
especially in the international law sphere,280 but it is not a question of veil
peeking, as it does not entail the attribution of shareholder legal
characteristics to the corporation.
Veil peeking questions are, however, critical in the context of state-owned
enterprises (SOE). Should state-owned enterprises be treated as state actors,
given the state’s equity ownership and control? Or should they be subject to
the general private legal regime applicable to business corporations, given
their legal form? To put it differently, can the state avoid some of its public law
constraints by employing the corporate form to perform certain activities?
Legal arbitrage aimed at avoiding the more cumbersome legal regime
applicable to the state is, in fact, a key practical justiﬁcation for the use of
government-controlled corporations. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
boasted the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 as “a
corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the
ﬂexibility and initiative of a private enterprise.”281 By adopting the corporate
form, the state becomes not only subject to corporate law but also to other
components of the legal regime governing private organizations.
However, the use of the corporate form is not a complete shield against
the public law regime, as courts often peek through the corporate veil to apply
the state’s legal regime to SOEs.282 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.283 provides a useful example.
Amtrak, a railroad corporation owned and controlled by the U.S. government,
had prohibited the display of political advertising messages at New York’s
Penn Station.284
279 See 69 of the Richest 100 Entities on the Planet are Corporations, not Governments, Figures Show,
GLOB. JUST. NOW (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/news/2018/oct/17/69-richest100-entities-planet-are-corporations-not-governments-figures-show [https://perma.cc/7BEG-GD6J]
(demonstrating the relative economic power of corporations relative to governments).
280 See, e.g., Oﬀ. of the High Comm’r, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/11/04, at 1, (2011) (diﬀerentiating between the state’s duty to protect human rights and
businesses’ duty to respect human rights).
281 The 1930s, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://www.tva.com/about-tva/our-history/the-1930s
[https://perma.cc/U5WS-2F7R] (internal quotation marks omitted).
282 For an early discussion of several veil peeking controversies regarding government-owned
corporations in the United States, see Robert H. Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and Their
Legal Problems, 14 N.C. L. REV. 337, 366 (1936), which concluded that “the corporations have been
reduced to the status of an ordinary suitor before the courts, and the principles of law as applied to
private litigants have controlled when there would be no disadvantage to the federal government by
so doing.” See also, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (ruling that a
corporate entity owned and controlled by the U.S. government was subject to the First Amendment).
283 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
284 Id. at 377.
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In Lebron, the question was whether Amtrak, whose company’s charter
explicitly disclaimed its status as a government entity, violated the First
Amendment.285 Answering in the aﬃrmative, the majority opinion engaged
in veil peeking to attribute the government’s legal regime to Amtrak in view
of its governmental objectives and the government’s ability to appoint a
majority of its directors.286 Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, by
contrast, qualiﬁed the question on which the Court granted certiorari as
essentially a distinct one of reverse veil peeking, that is, “[w]hether the
alleged suppression of Lebron’s speech by Amtrak, as a concededly private
entity, should be imputed to the Government.”287
More frequently, however, national constitutions and statutes expressly
incorporate a veil peeking approach by subjecting government-controlled
corporations to at least some of the public law constraints applied to the state.
Examples of such constraints are the application of public law mechanisms of
supervision such as controls by accounts tribunals and parliament and a
special labor and contracting regime.288 The result is that most SOEs,
including those whose shares are traded in public markets, are subject to a
distinctively hybrid regime; they are governed by roughly the same corporate
laws applicable to private ﬁrms and by a host of public law exceptions in
various areas.
In other realms, such as the application of sovereign immunity, the legal
regime is even less deferential to legal entity boundaries, privileging instead
the nature and purpose of the activity in question. Although the law is murky,
most legal instruments in this area embrace veil peeking to recognize that
separately incorporated SOEs nevertheless enjoy sovereign immunity if they
exercise governmental functions.289 Conversely, the same laws also establish
another form of asset partitioning in the absence of a separate legal person,
Id. at 392.
Id. at 386, 391.
Id. at 400 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
For a description of various components of such a hybrid regime, see generally Mariana
Pargendler, Aldo Musachhio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private
Investment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2013) (demonstrating constraints
of the application of public law mechanisms of supervision such as controls by accounts tribunals
and parliament); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed StateOwned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform, 50 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 473 (2017) (discussing the various components of a hybrid special labor and contracting regime).
289 See Cliﬀord Chance, STATE IMMUNITY AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2008)
(relying on the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90
Stat. 2891 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), the United Kingdom State Immunity Act
1978, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/33 [https://perma.cc/B6U7-XH7R], and the 2004
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res
A/59/508 (Dec. 2, 2004), to assert that the acts that an entity performs are determinative of an
entity’s treatment in court proceedings).
285
286
287
288
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by providing that assets used by the state for commercial activities are subject
to creditor enforcement, while those used for government purposes are not.290
Interestingly, this is an area in which regulatory status and asset partitioning
are primarily based on the character and purpose of the activity performed
by the state rather than on legal entity formalities.291
H. Corporate Law
Veil peeking is also common in corporate law. In assessing conﬂicts of
interest of controlling shareholders, courts habitually look behind the
corporate structure to ﬁnd the ultimate controller, thus ignoring the legal
personality of intermediate holding companies for imputation purposes.292
As in other ﬁelds, courts have also engaged in veil peeking to determine the
scope of application of speciﬁc corporate law statutes.
The Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger
International, Inc.293 exempliﬁes this approach. Here, the court had to decide
whether the requirement that shareholders approve a sale of substantially all
of a company’s assets under § 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) applied when the asset sale in question was conducted by a
corporation’s wholly owned subsidiary.294 The defendant Hollinger
International advanced a “technical statutory defense” based on the
subsidiary’s separate legal personality, ﬁnding that “§ 271 would have no
application unless the selling subsidiary has no corporate dignity under the
strict test for veil piercing.”295
The opinion by then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine articulates the policy
implications of both the reverse veil peeking approach advanced by the
plaintiﬀs and the regulatory partitioning approach proposed by the
defendants. The position upholding regulatory partitioning “has the virtues
that accompany all bright-line tests, which are considerable, in that they
provide clear guidance to transactional planners and limit litigation.”296 In
Id. at 16.
See id. at 2 (“[T]he form and structure of an entity and the nature of its legal and economic
relationship to the State, is now less important than the character of the acts which the entity
performs, and which form the subject matter of proceedings.”).
292 See, e.g., In re EZCORP Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962-VCL, 2016
WL 301245, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016), reconsideration granted in part, 2016 WL 727771 (“An
ultimate human controller who engages directly or indirectly in an interested transaction with a
corporation is potentially liable for breach of duty, even if other corporate actors made the formal
decision on behalf of the corporation, and even if the controller participated in the transaction
through intervening entities.”).
293 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C.).
294 Id. at 346.
295 Id. at 348.
296 Id. at 374.
290
291

2021]

Veil Peeking

777

addition, “[t]hat approach also adheres to the director-centered nature of our
law, which leaves directors with wide managerial freedom subject to the
strictures of equity, including entire fairness review of interested
transactions,”297 and “[i]t is through this centralized management that
stockholder wealth is largely created, or so much thinking goes.”298 On the
other hand, regulatory partitioning engenders the familiar risk of evasion, in
that “§ 271’s vote requirement will be rendered largely hortatory—reduced to
an easily side-stepped gesture.”299
The decision also stresses that the role of legal persons as a distinct nexus
of imputation does not operate in an “all-or-nothing” manner, instead holding
in certain contexts but not in others:
These [reasons for the creation of subsidiaries] include the desire to limit
liabilities to third parties involved in operating certain business lines to those
lines and to minimize tax liability. That the law recognizes the separate
existence of wholly owned subsidiaries for purposes like this does not
necessarily mean that it should recognize their separate existence for all
purposes. Yet, that is exactly what International’s argument is: that a wholly
owned subsidiary is either without any legal dignity at all in the sense that it
fails the severe test required to pierce the corporate veil or else its separate
existence must be recognized in all contexts. The utility of this stark, binary
approach is not immediately clear and does not comport with the approach
Delaware has taken in other areas of its corporate law.300

The Court, however, did not ultimately rule on the question of whether
the application of § 271 authorizes a veil peeking approach to encompass a sale
of assets by the subsidiary.301 Instead, Vice Chancellor Strine engaged in a
form of preliminary peeking of sorts by tentatively imputing the subsidiary’s
assets to the parent and then finding that, as a matter of “economic substance,”
the transaction in question did not qualify as a sale of substantially all of its
assets.302 Following the decision, the Delaware legislature amended the DGCL
to fill in the existing gap. It did so by embracing reverse veil peeking at the
statutory level to (1) provide that the assets of a wholly owned and controlled
subsidiary would be considered assets of the parent corporation for purposes
of the shareholder approval requirement set forth in § 271 and (2) exempt asset

297
298
299
300
301
302

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 375-85.
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sales, leases, and exchanges to and from a subsidiary from the requirement of
a shareholder vote.303
I. Contract Law
Veil peeking is also common in contract disputes. Unlike contractual veil
piercing claims, which center on the assets available to satisfy contractual
obligations, contractual veil peeking focuses on the meaning and scope of
contractual duties. Most contractual veil peeking cases concern regulatory
arbitrage, as when one contract party establishes a separate legal person to
evade existing contractual duties. The textbook example is the creation of a
corporation by party A to carry out a type of business that party A is
prohibited from pursuing due to a contractual covenant not to compete.
Faced with this scenario, courts have often agreed to peek and ﬁnd a
contractual violation.304 Similarly, in the prominent UK case of Jones v.
Lipman, Lipman had sold a property to plaintiﬀs, but subsequently, thinking
better of the deal, sold the property to a newly created company wholly owned
by him in order to prevent an order of speciﬁc performance.305 The Court
engaged in veil peeking to order speciﬁc performance both against Mr.
Lipman and the company, calling the company “a device and a sham, a mask
which [seller] holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the
eye of equity.”306
As in other ﬁelds, veil peeking in contract law is usually a matter of
contract construction or gap ﬁlling. A classic example is whether a contractual
right of ﬁrst refusal in connection with a sale of shares applies to indirect
share transfers (e.g., through the sale of shares in a holding company) when
the contract language in question is silent in this regard.307
In other cases, veil peeking can also be used for purposes of contract
interpretation in determining the will of the parties. Take, for instance, a
network of three related contracts entered into by Company A on one hand,
and each of Companies X, Y, and Z, on the other, with Y and Z being wholly
owned subsidiaries of parent Company X. If these contracts use the same
deﬁned terms, and Company X adopts a certain interpretation of a given
deﬁned term under its contract with Company A, veil peeking could serve to
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c) (2005).
For the U.K. law precedents, see, for example, Gilford Motor Co., Ltd. v. Horne [1933] Ch
935 and Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442.
305 Jones, [1962] 1 All ER at 442-44.
306 Id. at 445.
307 See, e.g., T.J.S.P., Apelação Cível No. 0217635-30.2011.8.26.0000, Relator: Enio Zuliani,
11.10,2011 (Braz.), https://tj-sp.jusbrasil.com.br/jurisprudencia/20658629/agravo-de-instrumento-ai2176353020118260000-sp-0217635-3020118260000-tjsp/inteiro-teor-110045232 [https://perma.
cc/47EN-BR5M].
303
304
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impute the same interpretation for the contracts between Company A and
Company Y. This is still another form of veil peeking without any prejudice
to asset partitioning. Such interpretation would be based on the economic
reality that wholly owned subsidiaries are subject to the parent’s control and
are not independent economic actors with independent wills—the same
rationale that underlies veil peeking in antitrust jurisprudence.308
Moreover, just as lawmakers often embrace veil peeking explicitly, leaving
little room for judicial gap ﬁlling, contracting parties may choose to attribute
shareholder-related events to the legal persons that are party to the contract.
Change-of-control clauses, a common feature of commercial practice, provide
a prominent example of explicit veil peeking by contracting parties. By
including a change-of-control clause, contracting parties essentially opt out
of the default legal regime of regulatory partitioning by making any change
in the control structure of the company an event of default under the relevant
agreement. The prevalence of change-of-control clauses in commercial
contracts shows that the identity of the controlling shareholder is often a
relevant business consideration for the contracting parties, which are not
always best served by the regime of strict regulatory partitioning.309
J. Miscellaneous Regulations and Social Sanctions
Beyond the various fields examined above, veil peeking also appears in
numerous controversies concerning the interpretation of specific statutes and
regulations, as illustrated by the prominent U.S. Supreme Court case of
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.310 One area in which veil peeking can be
used to compromise creditors’ rights without impinging on limited liability or
entity shielding is that of homestead exemptions. Various jurisdictions grant
special exemptions to the home of individual debtors against creditor claims.311
Homestead exemptions are effectively a form of asset partitioning imposed by
law without the creation of a separate legal person. However, a veil peeking
question then emerges when the real property in question, which serves as the
home for natural persons, is formally owned by legal persons controlled by
such individuals. Many U.S. courts have engaged in veil peeking by finding
that the corporation is a sham engineered by creditors to circumvent
See supra notes 197–200.
See generally, Li et al., supra note 155 (examining events of default in debt contracts).
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). A majority of the Supreme Court held that closely held corporations
could assert religious beliefs under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000BB to -4)—a statute that was silent on the treatment
of corporate entities—in order to avoid complying with the requirement of contraceptive coverage
under the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codiﬁed
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18122). Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
311 See generally George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950).
308
309
310
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homestead protection or have otherwise held that homestead protection
attaches to the possessory interest, rather than ownership of the property.312
Finally, veil peeking is not necessarily limited to the application of legal
rules, but may also extend to social sanctions. In 2019, consumers have
proposed to boycott luxury gym chains Equinox and SoulCycle after Stephen
Ross, a major shareholder and board chair of their parent company, hosted a
fundraiser for Donald Trump.313 Predictably, the companies sought to rebut
the boycott premised on veil peeking by asserting their independent values
and disclaiming control by Ross, which they described as a “passive investor”
who “is not involved in the management of either business.”314 More recently,
consumers and investors’ “buy Black” initiatives in 2020 exempliﬁes veil
peeking by social movements to favor Black-owned corporations and their
shareholders.315
CONCLUSION
The dominant view among legal and economic scholars is that the
corporation is a nexus for contracts, and that asset partitioning is the essential
function of corporate legal personality. This view is, however, incomplete.
Regulatory partitioning is critical in allowing the corporation to serve as a
nexus for contracts and regulation. The legal advantages and disadvantages
bestowed on this separate nexus are critical for the success and development
of the corporate form. A signiﬁcant portion of corporations existing in the
real-world appear to be formed for regulatory rather than contracting reasons.
Even more so than asset partitioning, the form of regulatory partitioning
provided by legal personality does not operate in an all-or-nothing fashion
but is rather “on and oﬀ.” As in John Dewey’s classical formulation, “for the
purpose of law the conception of ‘person’ is a legal conception; put roughly,
312 See, e.g., In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303, 316 (5th Cir. 2003) (ﬁnding that Texas homestead
protection attaches to an individual’s possessory interest in property owned by a corporation); Ritter
v. Citizens Bank (In re Ritter), No. 07-61071, 2009 WL 1024656, at *4 n.24 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar.
26, 2009) (surveying cases including In re Perry, supra, and concluding that “across-the-board” rules
for “homogeniz[ing] the Texas homestead decisions” have proven unhelpful).
313 See Brian Ries, Owner of SoulCycle and the Miami Dolphins Faces Outrage and Calls for Boycott over
Trump Fundraiser, CNN POL. (Aug. 8, 2019, 9:52 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/07/politics/equinoxsoulcycle-trump-fundraiser-boycott-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/7PVU-H3QH].
314 Ries, supra note 313; see also Jordan Valinsky, Equinox: Trump Fundraiser Stephen Ross Doesn’t Run
Our Company, CNN BUS. (Aug. 15, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/15/business/equinoxletter-stephen-ross/index.html [https://perma.cc/K3Y5-NYGB].
315 See, e.g., 180 Black-Owned Businesses to Support, N.Y. MAG. (June 18, 2020),
https://nymag.com/strategist/article/black-owned-businesses-support-shop.html [https://perma.cc/7H27MJ6K]; Paul Vigna & Mischa Frankl-Duval, Stocks of Black-Owned Companies Surge on Juneteenth Holiday,
WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2020, 5:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stocks-of-black-owned-companiessurge-on-juneteenth-holiday-11592603641 [https://perma.cc/9R5S-Q8VV].
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‘person’ signiﬁes what law makes it signify.”316 The state frequently sticks to
the corporation as a separate nexus for regulation for the attribution of legal
rights, duties, powers, privileges, disabilities, and immunities. However,
when the phenomenon of corporate control is critical to the eﬃcacy of the
regulatory scheme at hand, lawmakers and courts engage in veil peeking,
overcoming regulatory partitioning to attribute the identity or legal status of
shareholders to the corporation. In other circumstances, veil peeking is used
to level the regulatory playing ﬁeld across diﬀerent organizational forms.
Just as asset partitioning and regulatory partitioning constitute different
categories of corporate separateness subject to different tradeoffs, the
exceptions to asset partitioning and regulatory partitioning are equally
distinct. Veil piercing and veil peeking are driven by different considerations
and fulfill different functions, but have been conflated in legal scholarship
and practice. This Article unpacked veil peeking, showing that it is distinct
from veil piercing, but not a unitary category unto itself. It also offered
normative guidance for the resolution of veil peeking disputes. Courts
should not condition veil peeking on restrictive criteria such as fraud or
commingling of assets, but should instead consider the purpose of the
regulatory scheme in question.
The ongoing relevance of veil peeking casts doubt on the syllogistic
approaches that seek to derive precise legal consequences from the diﬀerent
theories of corporate personality—concession or artiﬁcial entity theory,
contractual theory, or real entity theory. The continued relevance of this
particular form of doctrinalism in U.S. legal thought is both surprising and
unwarranted. Incorporation serves diverse functions that cannot be captured
by a single theoretical rubric. Corporate separateness is an “on-and-oﬀ ”
mechanism used to achieve diﬀerent transactional and regulatory purposes.
The time has come to unbundle them.
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